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WHY ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS FAIL
JAN G. LAITOS* & LAUREN JOSEPH WOLONGEVICZ**
ABSTRACT
Although governments have deployed an array of environmental
protection laws, our planet continues to experience unprecedented envi-
ronmental “crises,” including climate change, resource depletion, species
extinction, ecosystem damage, and toxic air-water-land pollution. Despite
universal acknowledgment and recognition of these serious environmen-
tal issues, and despite a growing list of laws designed to address these
issues, the reality is that these adverse Earth-based environmental
changes continue, and may even be worsening. Environmental protection
laws have often failed because they usually include certain problematic
characteristics: they are anthropocentric, in that their goal is to protect
and benefit humans, not the environment in which humans live; they
assume human superiority and exceptionalism to nature and natural
processes; they are based on the notion that humans are separate from
nature; they presume that humans are not ultimately limited by planetary
boundaries, because they are superior and somehow insulated from nature.
Moreover, these laws use an unrealistic model for humans—where human
motivations are consistent with the homo economicus model used by tradi-
tional resource economists—the always rational, self-interested economic
person motivated by negative laws, which tell humans what not to do. They
also rely on an unrealistic model for nature, where nature is perceived too
simply, as a closely integrated, self-regulating, complex system that works
best when left alone by humans. This view is not consistent with the science
of how nature really works, which is as complex adaptive systems. This
Article reviews how these assumptions and models have largely influenced
legal resources and environmental decision-making over four distinct eras
during the past three hundred years—the Use, Conservation, Preservation,
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and Protection Eras. For environmental laws to work in a new, more
Ecocentric Era, laws would be built on three foundations. First, environ-
mental laws would not continue to rely exclusively on the assumptions and
models used in previous eras, but instead would reflect the reality of how
humans behave and nature works. Second, these laws would impose an
affirmative duty on humans to make choices consistent with ecological
integrity and planetary boundaries—in other words, rather than telling
humans what not to do, laws should tell or encourage humans what to do.
And third, rather than rely on rules that seek to prevent humans from cre-
ating negative environmental externalities, these new laws would create
incentives for humans to create positive ecocentric externalities.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental and natural resource laws permeate the statute
books of the United States. Anti-pollution laws seek to clean up the air,
water, and land;1 endangered species laws are designed to slow extinc-
tions;2 open space and parkland laws are intended to preserve dwindling
wilderness areas;3 forest management statutes try to conserve timberland
for future generations;4 and energy and mineral laws are in place to reg-
ulate the removal and use of valuable resources.5 These laws directing
human actions regarding natural and environmental resources have been
in place for decades and are both comprehensive and ubiquitous, at both
a national and state level. Nonetheless, despite all these laws, it is increas-
ingly becoming apparent that human actions have (1) dramatically altered
environmental spaces and natural systems;6 (2) started to exhaust the
planet’s store of natural resources;7 and (3) poisoned living organisms,
including humans, and their ecosystems.8 There is, then, an odd paradox.
We have been exceptionally aggressive in utilizing our legal institutions
to manage, regulate, and protect environmental and natural resources,
1 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–81 (2012).
4 See, e.g., National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–14 (2012).
5 See, e.g., General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22–47 (2012).
6 See Paulo Prada, Special Report: Rainforest Raiders Foil the Guardians of the Amazon,
REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-brazil-deforest
-special-report-idUSBREA0F0RU20140116, 
 http://perma.cc/AB7Q-BTSN; Darryl Fears, Global Warming Already Affecting U.S.,
White House Assessment Says, WASH. POST, May 7, 2014, at 19A; Robert Lee Hotz, Ocean
Levels Continue to Rise, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2013, at A4.
7 See Denise Chow, Water Woes: Vast US Aquifer is Being Tapped Out, DISCOVERY NEWS
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://news.discovery.com/earth/plants/kansas-aquifer-water-depletion
-130827.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/N7QM-H2D6.
8 See Maria Cheng, Air Pollution Causes Cancer, WHO Agency Concludes, MSN.COM
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://news.msn.com/science-technology/air-pollution-causes-cancer-who
-agency-concludes, archived at http://perma.cc/98ND-QS94; Seth Borenstein, Study:
Species Disappearing Far Faster than Before, MSN NEWS (May 29, 2014; 2:08 PM), http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/study-species-disappearing-far-faster, archived at http://perma.cc
/A5CS-VEE8.
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yet there is a growing consensus that the earth and its planetary systems
are in serious trouble.9 Why have all these laws been unable to do the job?
For nearly two centuries, laws directed at resource and environ-
mental regulations have relied on certain false assumptions about nature,
humans, and humans in nature. For example, underlying most environ-
mental and natural resource law is the belief that the primary purpose of
these laws should be to benefit humans, not humans as a component of
nature, not nature itself, and not the planet that contains both humans
and nature. These anthropocentric laws are mostly aimed at furthering
human benefits and welfare, and are also grounded in notions of human
superiority and exceptionalism. As such, our laws reflect a distinct sepa-
rateness between humans and nature, where humans are not part of
nature, but instead are apart and detached from nature.10 This separate-
ness is manifested in the way legal responses have neglected to concen-
trate on the harmful impacts human activities have on natural resources,
and instead have focused on how human actions affecting nature have
various destructive effects on humans. In addition, humans have until
relatively recently assumed that the earth’s resources were basically
limitless. It was only when resources began disappearing or were entirely
exhausted that humans began to acknowledge that there may be fixed
planetary boundaries that place limits on resource use.11
These wrong assumptions have helped to ensure the eventual fail-
ure of many of the laws that humans have put in place to address human
actions that disrupt Earth-based systems and resources. Another contrib-
utor to this failure is the tendency of environmental and natural resource
laws to be based on two unrealistic models.12 The first of these posits how
nature works. That model traditionally began with the idea that nature
will always achieve stability if left alone by humans, and that nature is
9 According to the latest United Nations intergovernmental report on climate change,
humans are interfering with the climate and the resultant climate change presents risks
for both humans and nature. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaption, and Vulnerability: Technical Summary, IPCC WGII
AR5 (Mar. 31, 2014) available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-TS
_FGDall.pdf.
10 See William Leiss, Modern Science, Enlightenment, and the Domination of Nature: No
Exit?, FAST CAPITALISM 2.2 (2007), http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2_2
/leiss, archived at http://perma.cc/Y364-8KUY (explaining that humans calculate the “world
as prey” and separate themselves from nature in order to master it).
11 See Johan Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472,
472 (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.studentsonice.com/antarctic2013/documents
/rockstrom_2009.pdf [hereinafter Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space].
12 Id.
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self-regulating.13 To the contrary, nature acts as a “complex adaptive
system,” which thrives on non-linear constant change, not stasis, where
humans cannot simply “leave nature alone” because we are not outside
of this system, but rather an inevitable and embedded part of it.14
The second unrealistic model is based on unsound beliefs about
how humans behave. Among the most cherished and longest held of these
beliefs, particularly by economists, is that humans are rational actors
driven by the self-interested need to maximize one’s own welfare.15 In real-
ity, however, humans sometimes act contrary to this rational actor homo
economicus model. They often behave altruistically or without any direct
benefit to the human actor, and are instead influenced by emotional and
cognitive biases, not just welfare maximization.16
Many of these erroneous assumptions and inaccurate models have
played out during the Four Troubled Eras of environmental and natural
resource laws. In Era I, the “Use” Era, humans assumed that resources
were largely inexhaustible and nonpollutable, and an ethic of resource
use for immediate human benefit pervaded the laws.17 In Era II, the
“Conservation” Era, lawmakers began to comprehend the importance of
maintaining resources for future generations, although the prevailing
attitude—that natural resources should be used by humans—was still
the dominant belief, even as laws aimed to manage and conserve re-
sources for later human use.18 Eventually, however, as humans began to
appreciate the consequences of planetary boundaries legal policies shifted
from a resource and conservation focus to an emphasis first on resource
preservation (Era III)19 and then environmental protection (Era IV).20 The
laws in Era III were aimed at preserving certain lands and species, such
as wilderness, parklands, and endangered wildlife that we realized were
disappearing.21 And the laws in Era IV were directed at protecting envi-
ronmental goods, like air and water, which were fast becoming polluted.22
13 Id. at 113.
14 Simon Levin et al., Social-Ecological Systems Are Complex Adaptive Systems: Modeling
and Policy Implications, 18 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 111 (April 2013).
15 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2009).
16 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (THE
STORRS LECTURE SERIES) 32 (2014).
17 See infra Part II.A.
18 See infra Part II.B.
19 See infra Part II.C.
20 See infra Part II.D.
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 See infra Part II.B.
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Nevertheless, in both Eras III and IV, laws were still anthropocentric and
based on notions of human separateness from nature.
Part I of this Article details the central fallacies that have under-
scored virtually all of our traditional legal responses to natural resources
and environmental goods. Part II recounts the four eras that have char-
acterized American environmental and natural resource laws. Part II il-
lustrates how lawmakers, mistakenly relying on faulty assumptions and
inexact models, have so degraded our laws that rules for resource use have
been unable to prevent humans from systematically removing, polluting,
and altering the planet’s resources and natural systems. Part III suggests
a new legal paradigm that might avoid the past flaws in our thinking about
humans and nature, and better establish more practical ground rules for
human-nature interactions. Part III outlines how a new class of “Era V”
laws would be more likely to bring about a better balance between humans
and nature, because such laws would reflect a more realistic view of all the
various components of the biosphere, including the one involving humans.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Several fallacies embedded in our natural resources and environ-
mental laws have historically caused them to fail to maintain a workable
and sustainable balance between humans and nature.23 Among these fal-
lacies are: (1) the myth of human superiority and exceptionalism; (2) the
belief in human separateness; and (3) the theory of no planetary bound-
aries. Lawmakers have not only relied on these false assumptions, but they
have also grounded their laws on inaccurate models as to how (1) nature
works and (2) humans behave.24 As a consequence of these wrong assump-
tions and unrealistic models, natural resources and environmental laws
have been unsuccessful and in some cases even destructive.25
A. Flawed Assumptions
One principal and recurrent theme in natural resources and envi-
ronmental laws is that they tend to fail because they include a number of
problematic characteristics rooted in anthropomorphism. Laws that are
23 See infra Part II.
24 See infra Part II.
25 For a discussion of how the underlying assumptions were destructive, see infra Part II.
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anthropocentric are aimed at protecting and benefiting humans, not the
environment in which humans live or even the planet itself.26 For example,
laws to preserve nature are often put in place not because of a desire to
safeguard the intrinsic value of nature, but rather, to protect humans’
ability to enjoy and use natural objects and places that are now preserved.27
Anthropocentric laws were particularly concerned with enhancing
the economic welfare of humans.28 Humans presumed that economic growth
and development always provided a benefit to civilized society.29 However,
this presumption of the inevitable benefits of economic growth is unsound.
The presumption results in a decision-making structure that systematically
overestimates the value of development and growth while underestimating
26 See Environmental Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 8, 2008), http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#IntChaEnvEth, archived at http://perma.cc
/XC5J-LSYP.
27 See John O’Neill, The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, 75 MONIST 119–38, 119 (1992). A quin-
tessential example of anthropomorphic laws are the laws adopted during the Preservation
and Protection eras (Eras III and IV) of the twentieth century that were designed to re-
strict the widespread resource exploitation by private owners that had contributed to vast
resource depletion; these laws created publically owned property and regulated privately
owned resources. DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 325–26 (2005); see, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 199 P.3d
629, 630 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing a home builder’s challenge to state air quality
permits that were required for earth-moving operations on privately owned land). But
these laws were not principally concerned with the harm caused to the environment by
resource overuse. JAN G. LAITOS, THE RIGHT OF NONUSE 55, 119 (2012) (“[T]he rationale for
the legal intervention has primarily been anthropocentric—to enhance immediate human
self-interest, or to prevent harm to humans.”). Rather, preservation and protection laws
were more focused on avoiding damage to human health and welfare, which seemed to
be the consequence of resource overuse and environmental degradation. Id.; RICHARD J.
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59 (2004).
28 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 119 (“[C]onsistent with standard welfare economics theory,
legal policies should depend ‘solely on concerns for human welfare.’ ”) (quoting LOUIS
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002) (emphasis in original)).
See generally ROBERT COSTANZA ET AL., THE VALUE OF THE WORLD’S ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
AND NATURAL CAPITAL, 387 NATURE 253, 253 (1997) (explaining that ecosystem services
provided between a 16- and 57-trillion-dollar annual global value).
29 See Joseph H. Guth, Cumulative Impacts: Death-Knell for Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Environmental Decisions, 11 BARRY L. REV. 23, 37 (2008). See generally Minxin Pei, China’s
Environment: An Economic Death Sentence, FORTUNE (Jan. 28, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://
fortune.com/2013/01/28/chinas-environment-an-economic-death-sentence/, archived at
http://perma.cc/WQ8A-BD5Y (discussing how China’s economic growth policy has led to
worsening environmental hazards); David Stanway, To Tackle Pollution, China to Drop
Growth at All Costs, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2013, 2:46 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2013/11/18/us-china-reform-environment-idUSBRE9AH07M20131118, archived at http://
perma.cc/L5QW-Q3HQ (“Three decades of industrialization and double-digit growth in
China have left the country badly polluted.”).
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its impact. Environmental decisions, then, are skewed in favor of economic
development over ecological integrity.30
Because major societal institutions have been premised on anthro-
pocentric assumptions, humans too often perceive the world through a lens
of human superiority and exceptionalism—a belief that the rules govern-
ing the rest of nature simply do not apply to humans.31 Consequently, the
workings of human social systems and their lawmaking institutions are
largely detached from the workings of the natural systems within which
they exist.
Anthropocentric natural resources and environmental laws orbiting
around notions of human exceptionalism further presume that humans are
not limited by natural and largely fixed planetary boundaries. However,
humans are in fact dependent upon the functioning of key planetary and
ecosystem processes that are responsible for maintaining the environ-
mental conditions necessary for both human life and all living organisms
on this planet. As a result of this reality, which humans have wanted to
deny, a sustainable relationship between humans and the rest of nature
requires that human activities be constrained and limited by the surround-
ing ecosystem’s ability to provide for that activity. Without that constraint
there will be irreversible degradation of critical ecological functions.32
Nonetheless, our laws have tended not to reflect the limits of planetary
boundaries where ecological integrity should be the standard by which
the permissibility of human activity is measured.33
1. Human Superiority and Exceptionalism
Ideas about human superiority and exceptionalism are based on
the dominant belief that humans (1) function independently from nature
and (2) are inherently superior to natural organisms. These twin beliefs
are repeatedly legitimized and perpetuated through societal and institu-
tional decisions34 and tend to insulate humans from the natural world.35
30 Id. Lawmaking decisions based primarily on the goal of economic development and its
dependence on the exploitation of nature degrades both critical ecosystem processes and
humans who rely on these systems.
31 At their core, views of human superiority and exceptionalism are ingrained in the self-
serving notion that humans are separate and independent from nature.
32 MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT: REDUCING HUMAN
IMPACT ON EARTH 4–5 (1996).
33 Guth, supra note 29, at 41.
34 See CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 63 (2d ed. 2011)
(discussing the prevalence of the anthropocentric world-view in dominant societies’ systems
of law).
35 See EMILIO F. MORAN, PEOPLE AND NATURE 7 (2006).
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For example, in the first two eras of natural resource laws, the
Use and Conservation Eras, humans deployed laws because we thought
that nature existed for our own benefit—to be exploited for the immedi-
ate present (Era I), or the eventual future (Era II).36 In Era I, where
resource use was the dominant ethos, it was thought that nature was in-
tended for productive human use.37 “[N]ature [had] a telos: to be fruitful
and support human life.”38 The ideology of human superiority arose in con-
junction with the belief that the natural world was created for humans’
productive benefit.39
The frontier mentality in the early nineteenth century, for instance,
embraced the idea that human labor and resource cultivation could, and
indeed should, improve the natural condition of the wilderness.40 The
largely unpopulated American West was perceived as fearsome, unruly,
and in need of human taming.41 By settling the frontier, Americans were
reclaiming what was otherwise considered waste, and then subordinating
natural resources to human desires and needs.42 What was driving these
actions was the assumption that humans were morally superior beings,
and as such, had a responsibility to exploit nature by exercising dominion
over it.43 This human-nature domination paradigm is still demonstrated
today in the general societal attitude that environmental laws should not
overly constrain human exploitation of nature.44
A belief in human superiority and exceptionalism continued to
exhibit itself during the conservation laws of Era II.45 By promulgating
various forest and timber management statutes, American lawmakers
assumed that they were intelligent enough to fine-tune natural processes
so as to manage, and even control, nature for eventual human use. For
36 See infra Part I.B.1.b.
37 Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 169 (2012) [hereinafter Purdy, American Natures].
38 Id. at 173.
39 See generally James Buchanan, President, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6,
1858) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29500) (summarizing
the task of territorial settlement as “generally to reclaim the wilderness”).
40 See id.; see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories,
and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 339 (1995) [hereinafter Wiener, Law and the
New Ecology].
41 Buchanan, supra note 39.
42 Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 181–82.
43 Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
1, 3–4 (1996) [hereinafter Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature].
44 Id. at 6.
45 See supra Part II.B.
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example, Gifford Pinchot, the national forest system’s leading architect,46
believed that management of the nation’s forests would ultimately serve
human ends. National forests would, if managed properly, provide “a con-
tinuous supply of timber.”47 The anthropocentric underpinnings of such
conservation laws of Era II, like the laws in Era I that encouraged re-
source use, were driven by assumptions of human entitlement and natural
dominance of nature.48 Their emphasis was not on seeking a practical
balance between humans and nature, but instead on controlling nature
for human consumption.
The belief that humans were superior to nature was linked to a
feeling that we were also gifted multitaskers. The idea of human exception-
alism contributed to the system that encouraged a multiple-use philosophy
for the nation’s forests and eventually for much of our public lands.49 Such
a resource management scheme assumed that humans could take charge
of natural processes, and manage natural resources according to human
beliefs about how nature works, even though these beliefs may be different
from the more complicated ecological realities of the environment.50 The
perception that humans not only can, but should, exercise dominion over
nature, ultimately resulted in humans distancing themselves from nature
even further.51
Even as the movement to preserve and protect threatened resources
and environmental goods gained steam in the late twentieth century, there
remained a general societal belief that natural resources and environmen-
tal laws should not confine humans’ ability to exploit nature.52 Although
Eras III and IV are marked by environmental preservation and protection
ethics, human superiority and exceptionalism, while present to a lesser
extent than in the first two eras, still enjoyed a prominent position in our
46 See generally DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT
AND THE CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 396–430 (2009).
47 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2012).
48 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 119–21.
49 The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA) required that national forests
be managed for multiple uses, including: fish and wildlife, rangeland, recreation, wilder-
ness, watersheds, and timber supplies, while maintaining the resources without impair-
ment of productivity “in perpetuity.” See Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16
U.S.C. §§ 473–82, 551 (2012).
50 See infra Part I.B.
51 Leiss, supra note 10; see also infra Part I.A.2 for an in-depth discussion of how human
superiority and exceptionalism have led to increased separateness between humans and
nature.
52 See Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, supra note 43, at 6.
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legal response to natural resources and environmental goods.53 While pres-
ervation and protection laws sought to address aesthetic, recreational, and
human health problems caused by resource overexploitation,54 such laws
also were designed to maintain the value nature was seen to impart to
humans in its pristine or unused state.55 As self-righteous beings, humans
have taken upon themselves the obligation, really almost a self-assigned
moral duty, to impose their superior and exceptional power over the nat-
ural world.56
2. Separateness
In addition to the anthropomorphic values of human superiority
and exceptionalism, natural resources and environmental laws reflect a
certain separateness between humans and nature, where humans are seg-
regated and independent from the natural world. Human separateness
rationally follows from the first flawed assumption—that humans are so
superior to nature that they can exercise dominion over natural resources.
Since we believe that we are exceptional beings able to manage nature,
there then must be an inherent level of human separation from the rest
of the world. Humans are, in effect, the predators, with all of nature the
prey. Human separateness also meant that humans did not concern them-
selves with whether their actions might have unforeseen consequences of
actually harming humans, because humans assumed that any bad deci-
sions about nature would be experienced by nature, not by humans.
The origins of this human-nature separation can be traced back
to seventeenth century notions that viewed the visible world, especially
the earth, as an intricate and complex machine.57 The earth, as well as its
organic components and systems, was thought to operate like any ma-
chine, according to fixed and unvarying rules.58 This mechanical world-
view helped to separate humans from nature: “When the natural world
is conceived as a machine, the human mind necessarily retains a godlike
portion outside of that world. It is this privileged position [that gives us
license] for the possession, mastery, and control of nature . . .”59
53 See infra Parts II.B. and II.C.
54 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 119.
55 Id.
56 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 191–94.
57 See David Abrams, The Mechanical and the Organic: On the Impact of Metaphor in
Science, in SCIENTISTS ON GAIA 66 (Stephen H. Schneider & Penelope J. Boston eds., 1991).
58 Id.
59 Abrams, supra note 57, at 68.
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Unfortunately, this degree of separation means that humans may
be moving ever further away from our connections with the environment.
For example, humans seem to have chosen material consumption over
ecological and sustainability ethics, and many consumers choose not to
adapt their buying practices to favor less wasteful and more environmen-
tally sound production of material goods.60 In other words, humans seem
increasingly detached from environmental realities. This detachment be-
comes particularly pronounced in a global economy, where decisions that
consumers make in one part of the world have environmental consequences
in another part of the world.61 People become oblivious to the actual ef-
fects of their consumption choices when individuals never receive any
actual feedback regarding the consequences of their decisions.62
To exacerbate the problem of human-nature separation, urban
populations have grown exponentially, which further distances humans
from ecological realities.63 Numerous technological advances similarly
hide from these urban dwellers their connection to the planet and their
environment.64 Additionally, governments generally do a poor job of provid-
ing their citizens with information about ecological realities.65 As a result,
human attitudes about nature are often ambiguous and contradictory: on
the one hand, many humans profess a commitment to environmental
protection, but on the other, these same humans continue to engage in
environmentally damaging behaviors.66
The laws of Eras III and IV that seek to preserve nature and pro-
tect environmental goods also reflect the inherent separateness between
60 See John Cairns, Jr., Abel Wolman Distinguished Lecture, Eco-societal Restoration: Re-
examining Human Society’s Relationship with Natural Systems (Dec. 5, 1994), in ESEP
BOOK 1: GOALS AND CONDITIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD, 21 (Inter-Research 2002)
[hereinafter Cairns, Eco-societal Restoration] (discussing how contemporary lifestyles have
brought us further away from the traditional connections humans had with nature). For a
discussion of the choices that humans make when ignoring natural laws and the conse-
quences that follow, see John Cairns, Jr., Sustainable Co-evolution, 14 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE
DEV. & WORLD ECOLOGY 103, 106 (2007) [hereinafter Cairns, Sustainable Co-evolution].
61 Modern lifestyles also mask the usual connections between humans and their surround-
ing natural systems. But see Cairns, Eco-societal Restoration, supra note 60.
62 Cairns, Eco-societal Restoration, supra note 60, at 24.
63 MORAN, supra note 35, at 68–69.
64 Cairns, Eco-societal Restoration, supra note 60.
65 MORAN, supra note 35, at 134–35; see also Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113 (“Individuals
repeatedly ignore the social costs of their actions, often because the people and organizations
that act locally are at least somewhat removed from those who suffer the consequences.
Making matters worse, negative changes tend to accumulate gradually in the broader
social-ecological environment.”).
66 MORAN, supra note 35, at 7.
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humans and the environment. For example, various environmental laws
have the goal of protecting nature from harm caused by humans, yet have
the effect, whether unintended or not, of further separating humanity from
nature.67 Environmental protection laws often seek to stifle human be-
haviors that produce negative externalities. But since humans generally
do not alter their behaviors without some perceived threat to their anthro-
pomorphic welfare, these laws are usually justified on anthropocentric, not
ecocentric, grounds.68 Anthropocentric environmental laws thereby sup-
press the conditions necessary for humans to engage in behaviors that rec-
ognize the intrinsic value of nature.69 Such laws fail to integrate humanity
and nature.70
Laws designed to preserve landscapes place restrictions on land-
owners, such as by limiting how they may use or develop their land. Such
limitations on human behaviors, which tell humans what not to do, result
in property owners having negative perceptions of preservation laws.71
Consequently, embittered landowners become more separated from nature,
exacerbating the detachment between humans and nature. When such
resource owners pass their values along to subsequent generations, the
likelihood of humans and nature becoming unified is reduced.72
3. No Planetary Boundaries
Another idea undermining environmental and natural resource
laws has been the belief that the earth and its resources are so vast that
there are no limits on humans’ use of natural resources and environmental
goods.73 Instead of perceiving limits, humans have operated under the
67 See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New
Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 11, 14–15 (2000).
68 Cairns, Eco-societal Restoration, supra note 60, at 24.
69 See Raymond De Young, Expanding & Evaluating Motives for Environmentally Respon-
sible Behavior, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 509, 515–17 (2000); Stephen Kaplan, Human Nature
and Environmentally Responsible Behavior, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 491, 497–99 (2000).
70 Doremus, supra note 67, at 15.
71 Id. at 43 (“The property rights stories often depict powerful regulators running roughshod
over landowners whose entire financial and emotional lives are closely tied to their land.”).
72 See Eric Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77,
109 (1995).
73 See Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space, supra note 11, at 472–74 (discussing the
threshold levels for Earth systems that, if crossed, could lead to “unacceptable environ-
mental change” and explaining that some boundaries, such as “global freshwater use,
change in land use, ocean acidification, and interference with the global phosphorus
cycle,” are close to being crossed while threshold levels for “climate change, rate of
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faulty assumption that natural resources are largely inexhaustible—the
boundless planet will continue to provide natural resources regardless of
human exploitation. Humans therefore can continue to fish, hunt, graze,
harvest, extract, remove, and pollute endlessly, and the planet will even-
tually self-correct and continue to offer whatever humans desire. However,
the reality is that planetary boundaries do exist. These boundaries mean
that all environmental goods are eventually limited, that the earth has
a fixed carrying capacity, and that human actions can adversely affect an
ecosystem’s ability to produce natural services.74
The assumption of no planetary boundaries is not conducive to a
sustainable human-nature relationship. Human societies are dependent
on functioning ecosystems and planetary processes that maintain the
environmental conditions required for both human and other planetary
life. Human activities must be constrained by the realities of ecosystem
and planetary limitations.75 To presume otherwise is to ensure that the
planet will likely undergo, if it has not already, irreversible degradation
of the biosphere.76
Unfortunately, natural resource laws have traditionally failed to
reflect the basic principle that there are planetary boundaries and that
consequently human behavior should be restrained in order to safeguard
the biological integrity of the planet.77 The laws put in place in the era of
resource use (Era I) and the era of conservation (Era II) did not effectively
restrict humans’ ability to extract natural resources and exploit environ-
mental goods. Accordingly, human activity often exceeded the ecological
limits of natural systems.
In Era I, laws completely ignored planetary boundaries and system-
atically rejected the idea that once used and exhausted, the resources that
were so highly coveted would be gone forever. As John Locke explained,
the natural environment was seemingly placed on this planet by a higher
force for the “industrious and rational”78—in other words, for human
biodiversity loss, and interference with the nitrogen cycle” have already exceeded their
planetary boundaries).
74 See Keith H. Hirokawa & Elizabeth J. Porter, Aligning Regulation with the Informational
Need: Ecosystem Services and the Next Generation of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV.
963, 969 (2013).
75 WACKERNAGEL & REES, supra note 32, at 4–5.
76 Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space, supra note 11.
77 Guth, supra note 29, at 41–42.
78 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 22 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1690);
see also JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 166–71
(1993) (describing the influence John Locke’s views had on early American legal thought).
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use. This belief, which permeated American legal and political thought in
Era I, is most easily seen in the rise of property law.79 Laws that granted
rights in land and resources to individual owners created private property
interests that allowed the owners to exploit their natural resources essen-
tially without any limits.80 Reckless exploitation of renewable and stock
resources in the twentieth century led to the unsustainable use and near
exhaustion of some natural resources, such as timber, rangeland, minerals,
oil, and gas.81 These resources were extracted, developed, and used without
appreciation for the reality of the natural limits of the resources.82
Even in Era II, where resource conservation laws reflected the
growing realization of dwindling natural supplies of stock and renewable
goods, the conservation was intended to ensure future human use, not a
restoration of human-nature balance.83 These laws were, once again, based
on anthropocentrism—the impetus for conservation laws being the fear that
once exhausted, humans would not be able to enjoy the historic benefits
from natural resources. Era II conservation laws continued to be grounded
in incorrect belief systems while failing to recognize the realities of the
earth’s limits.
By Era III, the Preservation Era, humans began to have an inkling
that, contrary to the assumption of no planetary boundaries, there may
in fact be some limits on certain resources, such as wilderness lands and
endangered wildlife.84 Nonetheless, humans adhered to inaccurate models
of how both humans and nature work, and these faulty models ultimately
undermined preservation efforts.85 Even in Era IV, the Protection Era,
where planetary boundaries became so evident that environmental protec-
tion laws became as ubiquitous as Era I resource use laws, humans con-
tinued to cling to the belief that societies organized in individual countries
are always benefited by economic growth and development.86 Indeed,
79 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 85.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 86.
82 See John R. McNeill, Resource Exploitation and Over-Exploitation: A Look at the 20th
Century, in EXPLOITATION AND OVEREXPLOITATION IN SOCIETIES PAST AND PRESENT 52–53
(Brigitta Benzing & Bernard Herrmann eds., 2003).
83 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 86.
84 See id. at 100–05.
85 See infra Part I.B.
86 Guth, supra note 29, at 26. See generally Pei, supra note 29 (discussing how China’s
economic growth policy has led to worsening environmental hazards); Stanway, supra
note 29 (“Three decades of industrialization and double-digit growth in China have left
the country badly polluted.”).
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despite overwhelming evidence that at least one planetary boundary—
greenhouse gas limits for a stable climate—is being exceeded, many in
Era IV still stubbornly deny this real limit on planetary systems.87
B. Inaccurate Models
Although there has been some attempt in environmental laws to
incorporate advances from the fields of large-scale ecology and complex
adaptive systems theory, a number of natural resources and environmental
laws still deny these realities of the true workings of nature in favor of
more anthropocentric ideas. These inaccurate views about how nature
works are based upon human convenience, not scientific realities.88 Central
to this belief system is the false idea that, when left alone, nature always
achieves stability.89 This misguided commitment to how we want nature to
function ignores the true dynamics of how natural systems actually operate.
The environmental standards that follow fail to ensure the integrity of
ecological functioning and may even contribute to its decline.
This misguided model about nature is not the only model that
erodes the effectiveness of environmental laws. A second flawed model that
drives many laws is grounded in the theory that humans behave as ratio-
nal actors—the homo economicus model.90 Consistent with this assump-
tion, it is thought that humans respond best when laws tell them what not
to do, or somehow punish or deter behavior that yields bad environmental
results. But, as will be seen below, humans may be more incentivized if
they are told what to do, and if their actions result in nonfinancial emo-
tional and psychological rewards, not economic punishment.91
1. How Nature Works
Natural resources and environmental laws too often fail to take
into account the true internal framework of natural systems. Despite
growing recognition of large-scale ecology theory,92 environmental laws
87 See Elaine McKewon, Chill Wind of Climate Denial, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 17,
2014, http://www.smh.com.au/national/chill-wind-of-climate-denial-20140612-3a0j1.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/7EYQ-WWL3.
88 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113.
89 Id.
90 Boris N. Mamlyuk, Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and Economics,
18 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 39, 62–63 (2010).
91 See infra Part III.C.
92 Fred Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 207, 222–23 (2002) (citing SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY
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continue to be based on the unsound idea that nature is ultimately self-
correcting.93 This more stable, self-regulating view is preferred because
lawmakers are more comfortable with anthropocentric laws aimed at maxi-
mizing human welfare. This view holds that nature is eventually able to rid
itself of human-induced poisons and ecological scars by being left alone;
all humans need to do then is temporarily step back and let nature and en-
vironmental processes correct themselves. Laws, in turn, should simply
order humans to “stop” behaving in environmentally destructive ways, and
nature will take care of itself. This approach is easier for humans to under-
stand, because (1) it does not require us to understand what really happens
when nature is left alone (which is not simple, but complex), and (2) it is
consistent with the assumption that humans and nature are separate.
a. Fragmentation
Natural resource and environmental laws are often rigidly orga-
nized by resource (e.g., timber, minerals, rangelands) or environmental
good (e.g., air, water, land). Such laws tend to consider particular natural
resources and environmental goods as independent ecosystems, existing
apart or separate from each other.94 These laws seek to empower humans
to manage according to the type of resource at issue, not according to the
complex dynamics between different ecological systems.95 A regulatory
fragmentation then takes place that separates natural resources (like
forests and rangelands) from their surrounding environment (like air,
water, and land).96 Just as artificially designed human geographic bound-
aries sometimes sever ecosystem relationships, regulatory fragmentation
plays a role in the mounting disconnect among different organisms and
ecological units.97
Fragmentation in laws also occurs when multiple government agen-
cies and private individuals manage a single natural resource, without
AND THE COMMONS 17–38 (1999) (discussing the emergence of large-scale ecology as a model
that links different scientific disciplines in studying natural systems and which recognizes
that “ecological systems are more than just the sum of their parts”)).
93 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113.
94 For an explanation of the fragmentation displayed in federal laws and how the legal sys-
tem fails to promote sustainable development, see Nancy P. Spyke, Heeding the Call: Making
Sustainability A Matter of Pennsylvania Law, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 729, 756–57 (2005).
95 Id.
96 John C. Dernbach & Scott Bernstein, Pursuing Sustainable Communities: Looking Back,
Looking Forward, 35 URB. LAW. 495, 498 (2003).
97 Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, The Challenge of Achieving Sustainable Development Through
Law, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10455, 10455 (1997).
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regard for environmental goods, such as the air, water, and land that af-
fect that resource.98 “When a number of interchangeable agencies perform
similar regulatory functions for a single resource, the result is inefficient
fragmentation, not resilience-inducing diversity.”99 But, natural resources
and environmental goods are inherently intertwined.100 They do not exist
in separate enclaves from one another and should not be regulated as
though they are independent entities.101
b. Nature as Self-Regulating v. Nature as a Complex
Adaptive System
Legal regimes that presume that resources are easily separated
into fragmented isolated systems will likely fail, and so too will laws which
are premised on the belief that nature should be left alone by humans.
This model of nature posits that natural resource systems are internally
self-correcting, and will achieve stability if preserved as islands free from
human interference.102 The basic idea behind this view is that what humans
need to do is enact preservation and protection laws that aim to stop
human interference with nature.103 Then, the harmful effects of human-
caused environmental change will be eliminated and nature will eventu-
ally achieve homeostasis.104
The reality is that ecosystems do not simply exist in a state of equi-
librium, but in fact are governed by various processes that interact with
one another and which form subsystems within the larger ecosystems,
and that humans have a role in affecting ecosystem functioning.105 These
subsystems are affected by numerous biological processes, which cause
98 Id. at 10456. For example, in the American Northwest salmon are managed by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Federal Regulatory Commission,
the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Bureau of Land Management, local and state
administrations, and private landowners.
99 Spyke, supra note 94, at 756.
100 Id. The natural world cannot be divided easily into discrete components of environ-
mental and resource use. Therefore, resources should not be regulated in isolation from
environmental protection standards, nor separately from one another.
101 See id.
102 See Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113–14 (discussing how distorted views of how natural
systems work lead to unproductive legal policies).
103 Id. at 117.
104 Id.
105 C.S. Holling et al., Sustainability and Panarchies, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 63 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S.
Holling eds., 2002).
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the subsystems to develop their own adaptive cycles.106 The harmful effects
of human-induced air, water, and land pollution, for example, should be
considered in the aggregate, as a chronic and highly influential component
of ecosystems and their subsystems. These natural systems are altered
by human interference, and they adapt and evolve to reflect that exoge-
nous anthropomorphic reality. Nature and nature’s ecosystems are not
self-regulating, but instead, become “complex adaptive systems.”107
Laws have, however, traditionally ignored these adaptive dynamics
between humans and ecosystems and their subsystems, which has led to
policies that are either ineffective or counterproductive.108 For example, in
Eras III and IV, the focus was first on resource preservation (Era III) and
then environmental protection (Era IV), because lawmakers mistakenly
relied on the belief that if left in a natural state (i.e., a state with little or
no human interference), environmental systems would achieve some kind
of equilibrium.109 But, in actuality, preservation and protection laws may
have actually hindered nature’s ability to maintain diversity and hetero-
geneity, which are essential components to a healthy ecological system.110
“Evolution under constant condition erodes genotypic diversity by selection,
which reduces the ability to respond to a changing environment. In compet-
itive or human-controlled situations, these selective processes also reduce
diversity by increasing the frequency of the most optimal types or ideas.”111
An even more problematic issue with many environmental laws
is that they incorporate such a level of rigidity that they fail to reflect the
nuanced and largely unpredictable reality of the environmental systems
that those laws seek to address. For example, the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”) demands prior consideration of the environmental
consequences of actions that will impact the environment.112 However, by
106 Id. at 68–69.
107 For more discussion of complex adaptive systems and a suggestion for how laws should
move towards a more realistic approach to natural resources and environmental law, see
infra Part III.B.I.
108 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113.
109 See infra Part II.
110 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 115.
111 Id.
112 See National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370a (2012).
NEPA has an essentially procedural mandate. See id. It requires federal agencies to con-
sider specific environmental issues during the decision-making process before the agency
action. Id. However, NEPA procedure does “not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 350 (1989) (citing Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227–28 (1980) (per curiam); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
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attempting to preemptively assess the impacts on nature of a certain
action, NEPA endorses a belief completely contrary to that established by
science.113 NEPA presumes that the consequences of anthropogenic action
can be anticipated before the fact in a relatively logical manner.114 How-
ever, nature is fundamentally non-linear and the reactions of its systems
are often not foreseeable.115
Laws such as NEPA should instead adopt a degree of flexibility
to accommodate the ever-changing and unpredictable characteristics of
nature, especially after anthropogenic changes occur in nature.116 Infus-
ing such reality within resource and environmental laws would entail two
major changes in policy. First, instead of concentrating solely on before-the-
fact legal action, we should also consider regulatory follow-up that takes
into account how nature has in fact engaged in after-the-fact adaptation.
Second, any workable and effective environmental and resource legal
regime should be grounded in how nature is, not how humans want nature
to be.117
2. How Humans Behave
Another model that decision makers rely on when crafting regula-
tion of natural resources and environmental goods is the idea that legal
policies should depend solely on concerns for human welfare.118 Consistent
with this model, optimized “Pareto Efficiency” is the end goal of regula-
tion, which is when human welfare achieves a state where the allocation
of resources is such that no person can be better off without one person
becoming worse off.119 Human welfare in turn is presumed to be a func-
tion of individuals’ well-being and existing preferences.120 It follows then,
113 See infra Part III.
114 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4366.
115 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113.
116 See Lance H. Gunderson, Ecological Resilience—In Theory and Application, 31 ANNU.
REV. ECOL. SYST. 425, 433 (2000).
117 For a more workable approach to environmental and natural resource laws, see infra
Part III (providing a suggestion for consideration on how to adapt our laws to more accu-
rately take into account the complex-adaptive model).
118 LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 23 (2002).
119 Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
512–13 (1980).
120 Once again, these legal policies are anthropocentric, focusing on exploiting the use com-
ponent of natural resources and environmental goods when humans wish to maximize their
well-being and economic welfare, or remedying the environmental problems that follow
when humans overuse resources that as a consequence results in pollution and health
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consistent with this standard economic model, that human welfare is not
dependent on the welfare or health of any nonhuman, natural system.
“The hallmark of welfare economics is that [legal] policies are assessed
exclusively in terms of their effects on the well-being of individuals. [W]hat-
ever is unrelated to individuals’ well-being is excluded from consideration
under welfare economics.”121
Era IV environmental protection laws, in particular, have been
premised on the assumption that humans act consistently with this homo
economicus model.122 Human behavior under the homo economicus model
is driven by the self-interested need to maximize one’s own welfare, and
more specifically, one’s economic welfare.123 Laws in Era IV attempted to
reflect rules advanced by resource economists, and law professors, who
argued that we needed to use economic models in order to change human
demand for, and exploitation of, natural resources.124 For instance, fed-
eral and state laws attempted to make resource extraction, development,
and use more costly.125 Other laws restricted the availability of natural
resources and even environmental goods, like air, by putting a cap on how
much human interference would be tolerated.126 Within that cap a market
in pollution would arise, and market participants (e.g., polluters) would
obey the normal laws of supply and demand to ensure that the cap was
never exceeded.127 Some laws punished resource developers and users with
taxes or flat bans.128
issues that adversely affect humans. Whether nature is thought most valuable to humans
when it is used, or when it is not used, the rationale for the legal intervention has primarily
been to enhance immediate human self-interest, or to prevent harm to humans. Joshua J.
Bruckerhoff, Note, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric Inter-
pretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615, 618 (2008); Susan Emmenegger
& Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature’s Rights Seriously: The Long Way to Biocentrism in
Environmental Law, 6 GEO. INT’L ENVTL L. REV. 545,552 (1994).
121 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 118, at 16.
122 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 48–49.
123 Boris N. Mamlyuk, Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and Economics,
18 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 39, 70 (2009) (explaining that the core values of the homo
economicus model are individualism and self-interest).
124 See generally LAITOS, supra note 27, at 48–62 (illustrating how economic models were
used in lawmaking during Era IV).
125 Id. at 49.
126 Id. at 53–54.
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470ee (2012) (providing
that “[n]o person may excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface any archeo-
logical resources located on public lands or Indian lands”); Colorado Parks and Outdoor
Recreation, COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-10-101 (2014) (declaring that the state’s policy was to
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The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, for example, imposes a flat prohi-
bition on resource use proposals that may hinder the scenic value of some
rivers or have a negative aesthetic effect on people wishing to view and
recreate on these rivers.129 Virtually all attempts to slow climate change
and the emission of greenhouse gasses do so by imposing a cap, or limit, on
the amount of carbon dioxide that is permitted from a particular source.130
These laws adhere to the standard economic notion that to bring about a
particular end humans need to be (1) directed on how to behave, (2) told
what not to do, or (3) economically discouraged from taking certain actions.
Otherwise, in accordance with the homo economicus model, humans would
mindlessly exploit resources and goods to selfishly benefit themselves.131
But this prevailing anthropocentric approach is deficient. It ignores
the fact that changes occur naturally to resources, natural systems, and
environmental processes that are not tied somehow to human welfare.132
These changes are consistent with organisms acting like complex adaptive
protect, preserve, enhance, and manage outdoor recreation areas “for the use, benefit, and
enjoyment of the people of this state and visitors of this state”); see also Rep. of the U.N.
Conf. on Env’t & Dev., prin. 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) (illustrating the
polluter pays principle, which requires a polluting private party or nation to bear the cost
of their pollution as a method of abating and allocating harm to the environment).
129 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2012) (“It is . . . the policy of the United States that certain selected
rivers of the Nation which, with their immediate environments, possess outstandingly
remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other
similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their im-
mediate environments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and
future generations.”). See generally § 1281(a).
130 See, e.g., Geoffrey Styles, Does EPA’s CO2 Rule Open a Back Door to Cap & Trade?,
ENERGY TRENDS INSIDER (June 12, 2014), http://www.energytrendsinsider.com/2014/06/12
/does-epas-co2-rule-open-a-back-door-to-cap-trade/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZY6J-Q9V2.
131 See generally Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (enforcing
that the state police power includes the ability to enact zoning regulations that promote
citizen health, safety, and welfare); Brian Goldberg, Note, New Reactions to Old Growth:
Land Use Law Reform in Florida, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 194–95 (2009) (“Government
possessed the authority to tell land owners for which purposes the owners’ land could be
used. . . . Planning would still give property owners the right to improve their lands, but
within limits and in accordance with the values enunciated by states and localities.”). In
Part III, this Article offers an alternative to the standard economic model that guides
environmental laws, and emphasizes laws that are more interested in how to encourage
humans to create positive externalities, as opposed to the current legal regime that is
focused on rules prohibiting negative externalities.
132 See, e.g., Virginia Dailey, Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles
Conflict at the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 331, 354 (2000) (“The notion of the homo
economicus, whose only goal is to maximize his or her wealth, ignores non-wealth-motivated
individuals (such as philanthropists and environmentalists) who want to protect the envi-
ronment for its aesthetic value.”).
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systems, but they may not necessarily further near-term human welfare.
Conversely, when anthropocentrism is instead supplemental to (or in some
cases even replaced by) ecocentrism, then resource long-term sustainability
and the planet’s survivability is more likely.133 In other words, what seems
needed is recognition that natural resources and environmental values are
a good in their own right, and that resource nonuse has intrinsic value,
irrespective of human welfare.134
It would be a paradigm shift to cease a long-standing policy in which
the protection and welfare maximization of humans is the central focus,
and replace it with one in which the natural environment (with humans
embedded within it) became the object of our laws. Policy makers would
not simply ask: What can we do to preserve and maintain something that
is good for us? Rather, the question would be: What should we do to protect
something because it is inherently necessary for the continuation of the
earth’s biosphere?135 A change to a nonanthropocentric perspective would
be similar to the altered world-view that took place in the seventeenth cen-
tury when scientists such as Galileo and Newton realized that humans
were not the center of the cosmos, where “the [pre-seventeenth century]
world was a play performed for our benefit. . . . In the new picture, man
is not the pinnacle of creation, but an afterthought.”136
Second, the anthropocentric homo economicus model presumes
that humans behave in predictable fashion, which is to rationally think
through the relative costs and benefits of choices, always with an eye to-
wards maximizing one’s selfish individual welfare.137 However, behav-
ioral psychologists are realizing that humans make choices for emotional
and intuitive reasons, where selflessness and altruism sometimes may
trump rational choice self-maximization.138 Laws which ignore this reality
133 Dinah Shelton, Environmental Rights, in PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 184, 186–87 (Philip Alston
ed. 2001); see also MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 31, 54 (2004).
134 Myrl L. Duncan, The Rights of Nature: Triumph for Holism or Pyrrhic Victory?, 31
WASHBURN L.J. 62, 62, 70 (1991); Lawrence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think about Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1343 (1974); see infra
Part III.
135 ECCY DE JONGE, SPINOZA AND DEEP ECOLOGY: CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
TO ENVIRONMENTALISM 9–15 (2004).
136 EDWARD DOLNICK, THE CLOCKWORK UNIVERSE: ISAAC NEWTON, THE ROYAL SOCIETY
AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN WORLD 95 (2011).
137 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 15, at 269–70.
138 See id. at 13; SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 28–29, 31. Even the godfather of law and
economics, Judge Richard A. Posner, has admitted that his previous “faith” in economic
analysis as the basis for legal action has been shaken. See Joel Cohen, An Interview with
Judge Richard A. Posner, 100.7 A.B.A. J. 52, 57 (2014) (“[D]evelopments in psychology
have required qualification of the ‘rational choice’ model of economic behavior.”).
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of human beings—e.g., laws which simply tell us what not to do—are bound
to be less effective than laws that are tailored to more accurate models of
human behavior. Laws that encourage what to do, may be more likely to
motivate positive human action. For example, state and local land use
laws that command or encourage humans to provide ecological exactions
as a prerequisite for development, or by promoting the use of conservation
easements, may receive a more positive reception than flat bans.139
II. THE FOUR TROUBLED ERAS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The American legal response to demands for natural resources
development, for preservation of certain lands and species, and for “pro-
tection” of the quality of environmental goods, may roughly be organized
around four “eras,” occurring over the past 200 years. During each of these
four eras, lawmakers have continually relied on certain assumptions and
inaccurate models (introduced in Part I) about nature, humans, and
humans’ place in nature.140 Subparts A and B below suggest how resource
use (Era I) and conservation (Era II) laws reflected anthropocentric
assumptions of human superiority, exceptionalism, separateness, and no
planetary boundaries. Subpart C explains how, when humans began to
realize that there were some limits to certain resources, they nonetheless
continued to ground their Era III preservation laws on premises grounded
in anthropocentrism and separateness. In this era of “preservation” law,
humans continued to rely on a model which postulates that nature will
achieve stability if preserved (in fragmented islands) and left alone.
Subpart D explains that Era IV environmental protection laws still were
characterized by anthropomorphism and premised on human-nature
separateness, but at least no longer denied the realities of planetary
boundaries. However, Era IV laws were, and still largely are, rooted in
the standard homo economicus model that assumes humans behave as
rational welfare-maximizing actors.
A. Era One—Resource Use
Laws in Era I, the “Use” Era, arose in a 200-year period between
the beginning of the seventeenth century and end of the nineteenth
139 See Goldberg, supra note 131, at 194–95, 197 (explaining that certain types of zoning
regulations block high-intensity development while simultaneously ensuring the preser-
vation of natural landscapes).
140 See supra Part I.
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century.141 Era I laws were grounded in the anthropomorphic belief that
nature and its natural resources were meant for productive human use.142
The American westward expansion, for example, was driven in part by
the view that the land and natural bounty of this new continent were
intended to be used by humans who were both “industrious and rational.”143
Lawmakers embraced the ideology that use of natural resources was a
virtue.144 Out of this belief system emerged a private property and owner-
ship regime that helped facilitate the exploitation of nature. The core
idea of private ownership rights in land and resources was already present
in some European countries,145 and it became an integral part of the
United States’ economy by the nineteenth century.146
The advent of the law of property ownership encouraged the rush
to exploit natural resources.147 The ensuing charge to extract, develop,
and use natural resources depleted stock resources and frequently out-
paced the regeneration of renewable resources.148 Users were principally
concerned with the individual benefits they derived from exploiting the
natural world, and were unconcerned if their use and removal of these
resources imposed negative externalities for a larger group of potential
future users, who would thereby be denied their opportunity to benefit
from the resource.149 Era I laws reflected a high discount rate, where
future value was discounted in favor of present benefits.150 Era I anthro-
pomorphic ideas led resource users to predictably make choices based on
141 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 169.
142 See id. (discussing how the belief that nature is intended for human productive use “justi-
fied the European claim to North America, [and] defined public debates about nature in
the early republic, and persists in important aspects of private and public land-use law.”).
143 LOCKE, supra note 78, at 22.
144 7 Cong. Rec. 1861–69 (1878).
145 DOUGLAS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW
ECONOMIC HISTORY 22–23 (1973).
146 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350–53
(1967) (describing the evolution of private property rights amongst American Indians, and
within the fur trade); David Feeny, The Development of Property Rights in Land: A Com-
parative Study, in TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT: A RATIONAL CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 294 (Bates ed., 1988) (describing the United States’ colonization of the Philip-
pines in 1898, and the subsequent confusion between the different property rights schemes).
147 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNITED STATES 7 (1956) (“[Nineteenth century Americans] had in common a deep faith
in the social benefits to flow from a rapid increase in productivity.”).
148 See CAROL A. DAHL, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS: UNDERSTANDING PRICING,
POLICY, AND PROFITS 16–22, 35 (2004).
149 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 19.
150 Id.
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their own near-term self-interest without regard for widespread and
future consequences.151
The property rights idea in this country originated with early
colonial ideals of sovereignty and resistance to tyranny that dominated
American thought before and immediately after independence from the
British crown.152 Indeed, one of the foremost complaints the colonists
had against the King was that he had denied them the right to cultivate
land west of the Alleghenies.153 The colonists “aligned clearing and using
the land with inviolable human rights, invoking the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.”154 According to one American historian, colonists linked the
idea of freedom with the notion of private ownership of land and natural
resources, because institutions built on such private property regimes
allowed settlers the opportunity to become proprietors, which in turn gave
individuals dignity.155
The idea of property was also rooted in the assumption, advanced
by John Locke, that resource ownership evolved through individual labor.156
That is, individuals had a natural right of private ownership to land and
natural resources, but the mere passive ownership of natural assets was in-
sufficient; resources also needed to be used by the owners where labor was
an obvious manifestation that the resource’s potential was being released.157
151 Id. at 42. As a result of extensive resource use, “[f]orests and woodlands shrank, account-
ing for perhaps half of the net deforestation in world history. . . . Rangelands and pasture-
lands became overgrazed, degrading or destroying naturally occurring grasslands along
with the considerable ecological values provided when these resources are not used as a
commodity.” Id. (citing SING C. CHEW, WORLD ECOLOGICAL DEGRADATION: ACCUMULATION,
URBANIZATION AND DEFORESTATION, 3000 B.C.–A.D. 2000, at 3 (2001); J.R. MCNEILL,
SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY WORLD 229–47 (2009); DAVID EVANS, A HISTORY OF NATURE CONSERVATION IN
BRITAIN 57 (2d ed. 1992); DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION & PROPERTY 97 (2002)).
152 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 173.
153 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
154 Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1141 (2010) [hereinafter Purdy, The Politics of Nature].
155 See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 1–72 (1995 ed. 1995) (explaining that manual labor was
elevated to a high status in the American social system and gave people a sense of per-
sonal worth); see also DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 48–100, 185–208 (1980) (discussing how the American concept
of freedom was coupled with ownership principles).
156 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 37–38.
157 See id.; see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause,
72 MO. L. REV. 525, 526 (2007) (discussing how John Locke’s Two Treaties of Government
provided a “coherent intellectual justification” for private property).
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Locke’s labor theory justified both the initial acquisition and subsequent
ownership and use of natural resources.158 Era I laws mirrored the influen-
tial Lockian ideology “to make the continent fruitful by disbursing land
to private owners and promoting infrastructure to translate their labors
into continental commerce.”159
Beliefs about anthropomorphic superiority and exceptionalism
contributed to the prominence of private property laws that encouraged
resource use, as demonstrated by the prevailing idea that uncultivated
land amounted to waste.160 According to the dominant frontier mentality
in the early and mid-nineteenth century, by settling and therefore taming
the wilderness, Americans would reclaim the waste.161 Humans operated
under the assumption that they had a natural right to dominate their
environment because they were morally superior beings that would bring
anthropomorphic refinement and civilization to wilderness.162
In Era I, humans also assumed they were separate and detached
from nature, and therefore saw land, nature, and natural objects as gifts
to acquire and own and control.163 Nor did humans in Era I consider the
long-term consequences of their overzealous resource use. Humans did not
take into account that the earth would be unable to supply natural re-
sources or environmental goods forever, because the humans in Era I (and
their laws) had no conception of inherent planetary boundaries.164 Rather,
the singular focus was to exploit, dominate, own, and above all use natural
resources consistent with Lockian theories about private property. “The
right to have a legal property interest in a natural resource grant[ed] the
158 Gaba, supra note 157, at 533.
159 Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 185; see Gaba, supra note 157, at 536 (ex-
plaining that Locke’s labor theory was premised on the assumption that even in the absence
of government laws, there was an undeniable natural law which allowed individuals to
assert their ownership rights by mixing their labor with a piece of property).
160 See Andrew Jackson, President, Fourth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 4, 1832)
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29474) (“[A] portion of the
waste lands owned by the States should be ceded to the United States for the purposes
of general harmony and as a fund to meet the expenses of the war.”); Martin van Buren,
President, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1837) (transcript available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29479) (declaring that west bound settlers moving
westward left “immense wastes behind them and enlarge[d] the frontier beyond the
means of the Government to afford it adequate protection. . . .”).
161 Buchanan, supra note 39 (stating that the job of American settlers was “generally to
reclaim the wilderness”).
162 See supra notes 40–47.
163 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 85.
164 See supra notes 82–86.
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owner dominion over it, which in effect remove[d] the privately owned re-
source from the realm of nature while transferring its potential utility to
the human owner.”165 As a consequence, humans became largely insulated
from their connections with the rest of nature. Such isolation meant that
humans were mostly oblivious to the effects their actions had, and would
have, on the planet’s ecosystems and natural systems.
B. Era Two—Conservation
Although laws in Era II, the “Conservation” Era, continued to
reflect assumptions about human superiority and separateness, decision-
makers finally began to comprehend that humans were exhausting natural
resources.166 Lawmakers realized that a use-only ethic would eventually
produce long-term resource shortages, because one fast-becoming-apparent
planetary boundary was the earth’s fixed supply of natural resources.167
To ensure that future generations could still use certain diminishing
resources, present use needed to be tempered by a need also to conserve
for future use.168 In the latter part of the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, these conservation ideals surfaced as part of a progres-
sive legal reform movement, which was reflected in federal land policy.169
Conservation laws, however, continued to be anthropomorphic, motivated
by what was in the best interest for humans.170 These laws adhered to
the belief that nature was intended for productive future human use.171
Era II laws also continued to be grounded in incorrect belief systems
about nature and humans.172
As had been the case in Era I, the distribution of property inter-
ests was still a primary vehicle by which natural resources and environ-
mental goods were exploited in Era II.173 But during this time lawmakers
165 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 87.
166 See Purdy, The Politics of Nature, supra note 154, at 12–13.
167 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 86.
168 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 173.
169 See id. at 169.
170 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 85.
171 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 169 (“In this view, natural systems will
reliably serve human ends only with expert governance at the system level: irrigation
networks, silviculture, game preserves, and parks administration were early paradigms
of this understanding.”).
172 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 78.
173 See Leonard Zobler, An Economic-Historical View of Natural Resource Use and
Conservation, 38 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 189, 190 (1962).
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began to appreciate the importance of maintaining resources for sustain-
able future use.174 This conservation override on present use served to
diminish the role of privatization and gave government a more resource
managerial role.175 Federal agencies, such as the United States Forest
Service and the National Park Service, were established to ensure that
certain resources would outlast the current generation.176 Behind these
laws was the realization that the private market should not be the sole
arbitrator that controls the allocation of natural resources.177 Instead,
government policy would regulate the rate of depletion of stock resources
and ensure the sustainability of particular renewable resources.178
When stock energy resources like oil, gas, and coal began to be de-
pleted, lawmakers initiated reform efforts to ensure that if these valuable
minerals were owned by the government, then that government would
control their rate of depletion.179 When an otherwise renewable resource,
like timber, was overharvested, lawmakers imposed conservation limits
on timber-cutting.180 And when cattle and sheep grazing threatened to
denude the nation’s grasslands, conservation legislation restricted and
managed rangeland use by ranchers.181
Conservation thinkers, such as Gifford Pinchot, the founder of the
U.S. Forest Service, Perkins Marsh, a leading American diplomat and
philologist, and Theodore Roosevelt, all advocated for government to take
a more active role in regulating use of natural resources.182 As the nation’s
leading forester, Pinchot argued that without a conservation mandate,
America’s forests awaited a doomed fate—they would all soon be cleared.183
Pinchot similarly believed that the Era I use ethic would eventually empty
174 See LAITOS, supra note 27, at 86.
175 Conservation laws manage over a quarter of the United States’ acreage. Purdy,
American Natures, supra note 37, at 173, 189.
176 See Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 473–75, 477–78(a), 479(a), 482 (2012)); An Act to Establish a Natural Park
Service, Pub. L. No. 64-238, 39 Stat. 535 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
177 See Purdy, The Politics of Nature, supra note 154, at 13–14.
178 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 92.
179 The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2014).
180 The Forest Reserve Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891).
181 Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2014).
182 See generally GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (Double Day, Page &
Co. 1910); GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (David Lowenthal ed., Univ. of
Washington Press 2003) (1864) (advocating for the cessation of unregulated timber-
cutting in public forests); Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism (Aug. 3, 1910), in
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM (1961).
183 PINCHOT, supra note 182, at 17.
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the mines, erode the waterbeds and cause the rich soil to become barren.184
As early as 1890 the American Forestry Association presented similar
arguments to Congress,185 and by 1891 a report by the Secretary of the
Interior Department urged Congress and the President to intervene and
establish limits on resource use, especially the timber resource.186
Pinchot was not alone in advocating for resource conservation.
Perkins Marsh stressed that healthy forests prevented erosion and played
a vital role in soil integrity, promoting reasonably steady water flows and
benefiting people that lived downstream who depended on continuous
stream flow.187 Theodore Roosevelt sought to invoke a spirit of civic motiva-
tion by declaring that Americans owed it to themselves and to future
generations to conserve natural resources.188 “[T]he health and vitality
of our people are at least as well worth conserving as their forests, waters,
lands, and minerals,” Roosevelt stated in a 1910 speech.189
But conservation laws still encouraged resource use.190 Their goal
was to “manage present resources for undiminished future benefits.”191
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, for example, withdrew gas, coal, oil,
and oil shale from the giveaway provisions of the General Mining Act of
1872 that otherwise offered individuals ownership rights to these valu-
able energy resources.192 But use was still permitted, despite the with-
drawal, since the Leasing Act simply placed energy developers within a
leasing system instead of an ownership regime193 Consistent with the
leasing system, use of stock resources could occur, albeit in line with a
theme of more regulated use.194
In addition to optimizing resource use, Era II conservationists also
were concerned with the “spoliation of human bodies and energies.”195
184 See generally id.
185 See 21 CONG. REC. 2537 (1890).
186 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 14 (1891) (discussing
the importance of avoiding stream erosion and the danger of unregulated timbering).
187 Jedediah Purdy, What Has to Change for Forests to Be Saved? A Historical Example from
the United States, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 467, 471 (2009) (“Their experience of ecologi-
cal interconnectedness as a motive for political action was among the earliest instances
of a new approach to the natural world.”).
188 See Roosevelt, supra note 182.
189 See id.
190 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 94.
191 Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 190.
192 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 94.
193 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 22 (2012); JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW 18–26 (2d ed. 1995).
194 LOWE, supra note 193, at 18–26.
195 Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 192.
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Conserving natural spaces for their aesthetic beauty and recreational uses
was thought to be of benefit to citizens’ physical and mental health.196
National forests, for instance, were to provide “a continuous supply of
timber,”197 while national parks had the “fundamental purpose” to “con-
serve [for humans] the scenery and the natural and historic objects and
wild life therein . . . .”198
Era II laws, therefore, were still rooted in anthropomorphic
principles about what would benefit humans. And because these laws
presumed that human managers could manipulate resources and natural
processes to serve human interests, they were driven by assumptions of
human superiority and exceptionalism.199 The goal of conservation laws
was not to strike a balance between humans and nature, but rather to
control natural resources for human consumption and economic welfare.
Humans assumed that they were superior entities that could and should
control, and even adjust, natural processes so as to ensure that nature
would continue to provide for both current and future humans’ needs.
Most of the flawed assumptions and incorrect models of Era I
largely remained in place during Era II. Human exceptionalism and
superiority justified the central tenet of Era II, which was that humans
could manipulate and control natural processes to enhance present and
future human welfare. The belief that humans can, and should, control
nature also contributed to the separation between humans and nature.200
These laws were grounded in an overly simplified conception of nature,
and how nature works. The human engineer in Era II could seize control
of natural processes and force particular resources to do the bidding of
human masters.201
Another assumption that remained was the notion of the “rational
man.” The goal of these Era II laws was to further homo economicus, the
rational decision maker whose economic welfare, present and past, was the
epitome of societal optimality.202 What was unique about Era II was the
growing, and correct, realization that unchecked resource use would even-
tually encounter planetary limits. But even this eventual recognition of
planetary limits did not produce laws that effectively limited the extraction
196 Id.
197 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2012).
198 § 1.
199 See supra Part I.A.1 (“A belief in human superiority and exceptionalism continued to
exhibit itself during the conservation laws of Era II.”).
200 Leiss, supra note 10; see also supra Part I.A.2.
201 See supra Part I.A.2.
202 See generally supra Part I.A.2.
32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:1
and use of natural resources. While conservation laws did limit the use
rights of private parties, they continued to authorize the exploitation of
resources through public land management statutes.203
C. Era Three—Preservation
Laws in Era III, the “Preservation” Era, which first appeared during
the middle of the twentieth century, reflected a change in assumptions
about the limits of natural resources.204 Lawmakers discovered, to their
bewilderment, that some natural resources and iconic vistas, as well as
various wildlife species and historic sites, were disappearing as a result
of the resource policies of the previous two eras. As a response to this
alarming reality, laws were hurriedly adopted that were designed to pre-
serve places, like wild rivers and wilderness areas, and certain natural
objects, like endangered plants and animals, as well as archeological ruins
that evidenced our cultural heritage.205 Increased understanding about
the limits of Earth’s plentitude demonstrated an emerging central belief
that was contrary to the foundation of many Era I use laws—that there
were real planetary boundaries.
Nonetheless, Era III laws continued to be centered on anthropo-
centric values. Landscapes and natural objects were preserved because
it was thought that humans would benefit from their existence.206 And
this policy reinforced the continuation of the separation between humans
and nature, since preservation laws created pristine areas that were off-
limits to human interference, but which allowed us to view these special
places from the outside.
Even worse, however, preservation laws relied on the unrealistic
model that nature should be left alone, in protected islands, because it
is self-regulating.207 Preservation laws failed to preserve ecosystems and
203 See Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473–82 (2012).
204 See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271.
205 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Obama Will Propose Expanding Pacific Sanctuary, DENVER
POST, June 17, 2014, at 14A.
206 See Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 173 (“[C]ertain places or qualities in the
natural world elicit essential human experiences. Alone in the wilderness, or facing the
dramatic vistas that Romantic aesthetics deemed sublime, people could shake off habit
and custom, discover their authentic wishes and convictions, and become, in that respect,
more free. Romantic epiphany has seemed a way to salvage individuality and meaning
from a disenchanted and pervasively managed world.”).
207 See DON HINRICHSEN ET AL., CONSEQUENCE OF OVERUSE AND POLLUTION, XXVI
POPULATION REPORTS, ch. 4 (Info Program ed., 1998); WILLIAM MCKIBBEN, THE END OF
NATURE 51 (2006).
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the larger environmental spaces enveloping specially protected lands and
object.208 Consequently, environmental goods continued to degrade and
fall below suboptimal levels.209
Firmly embedded in Era III laws was the anthropocentric premise
that nature, in its untouched state, provided psychic, almost semi-religious
value to humans.210 Part of this perceived benefit was the deeply personal
and often mystical feelings humans had about nature.211 Behind this idea
was the belief that untouched nature had an almost transcendent power—
experiencing the natural beauty of the outdoors could lead one towards
self-enlightenment and awareness.212 In the Wilderness Act of 1964, for
example, Congress defined wilderness as a place that offered “outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recre-
ation.”213 This recognition of the benefits nature provided for humans when
it remained unused justified government rules demanding preserved spe-
cial lands found in national forests, national parks, national refuges, and
wild rivers.214
Humans also realized that they cared deeply about preserving
wildlands, wildlife, and endangered species and their habitats, partly
because of an emotional, non-economic appreciation of the benefits that
follow from humans being closely interconnected with their natural
environment.215 John Muir, an American naturalist and the founder of the
208 See HINRICHSEN ET AL., supra note 207.
209 See id.; MCKIBBEN, supra note 207.
210 Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 169–73 (describing the “aesthetic and
spiritual value[s] of nature”).
211 See, e.g., Wallace Stegner, Why We Need Wilderness, MOTHER EARTH NEWS, Aug./Sept.
2004, at 64, 65.
212 Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 199–200; see also Dan Tarlock, Is a Sub-
stantive, Non-positivist United States Environmental Law Possible?, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL.
& ADMIN. L. 159, 191 (2012) (“The early preservation movement saw landscapes as awe
inspiring natural areas, endowed with rights, which spiritually uplifted and sustained
us with their physical beauty, compelling us to maintain their natural state.”).
213 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012).
214 See, e.g., Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–81(a) (2012) (“It is . . . the
policy of the United States that certain selected rivers of the Nation which, with their imme-
diate environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish
and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing
condition, and that they and their immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit
and enjoyment of present and future generations.”); National Forest Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–14; Colorado v. New Mexico, 467, U.S. 310, 314 (1984) (discussing
the importance of in-stream flow in relation to water users’ needs for a continuous supply).
215 Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling
of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1126–27 (1994); JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST
SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 175 (1911).
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Sierra Club, described the connection with nature that he discovered in
his first summer exploring the Sierra Nevada:
Never before had I seen so glorious a landscape, so bound-
less an affluence of sublime mountain beauty. . . . I shouted
and gesticulated in a wild burst of ecstasy . . . . [T]he whole
body seems to feel beauty when exposed to it as it feels the
camp-fire or sunshine, entering not by the eyes alone, but
equally through all one’s flesh like radiant heat, making
a passionate ecstatic pleasure-glow not explainable.216
Not only did nature in its pristine state provide a spiritual and
aesthetic benefit to humans, people also were concerned that unchecked
exploitation of natural resources and environmental goods adversely
affected human health and welfare.217 What seemed most troubling in
Era III were activities adversely impacting the “quality of the human
environment.”218 What seemed less troubling were human actions that
degraded natural environmental systems necessary for the continuation
of the biosphere.219
This anthropocentric emphasis was particularly apparent in laws
designed to address overuse of open access resources, such as air and
water.220 In addition, many of the preservation laws of Era III emphasized
the need for publically owned lands to be protected from development
because of the “anthropocentric virtues of wild lands.”221 For instance, the
purpose of the National Wilderness Preservation System was to desig-
nate certain federally owned areas as:
216 MUIR, supra note 215, at 153, 175.
217 See LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 59.
218 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2012) (establishing that under the National Environmental
Policy Act, an environmental impact statement must be prepared if a proposed action
might impact the human environment) (emphasis added).
219 See generally Günther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A
Mildly “Revisionist” View, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 117 (Antonio Trindade ed., 1992) (explaining that preservationist statutes
and regulations were focused on the harmful effects resource use decisions had on humans,
instead of the deleterious impacts they had on the natural environment itself).
220 Resources such as air, sunlight, and wind, are open access goods because they are not
subject to private ownership the same way specific tracts of land, for example, can be. JAN
G. LAITOS, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 2–3 (2002). That is, they are open to the public and
considered common property because it is not practical for users to exclude others. See id.
221 Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: Political Prestidigitation and an Enduring
Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1040 (2004). See Wilderness Act of 1964, 16
U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2012); LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 93.
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“[W]ilderness areas,” [which] shall be administered for the
use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner
as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment
as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these
areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and
for the gathering and dissemination of information regard-
ing their use and enjoyment as wilderness.222
By “secur[ing] . . . an enduring resource of wilderness” for human benefit,223
Congress sought to ensure that natural resources and objects would pro-
vide value to present and future generations of Americans.224
Era III laws were not only shaped by anthropocentric ideals, their
preservation emphasis was also grounded in the belief that, if left alone
in a natural state, nature would eventually self-correct and reach some
kind of eco-friendly balance with humans.225 In other words, by preserv-
ing nature and preventing “the imprint of man’s work,”226 the natural
world would revert back to a condition which was considered desirable
and beneficial for human welfare and enjoyment. But the reality of nature
is that it is never in balance, but rather is asymmetrically dynamic and
changing as a “complex adaptive system.”227 Ecosystems do not exist in
a constant state of equilibrium, but rather are influenced by various chang-
ing intertwined natural processes.228 By preserving focused, localized areas,
environmental spaces, and natural objects, Era III laws may have denied
to nature the essential components of diversity and heterogeneity, which
are vital to a healthy ecosystem.229
D. Era Four—Protection
Era IV, the “Protection” Era, began in the latter half of the twenti-
eth century and continues to this day. In Era IV, environmental goods
were protected, primarily air and water, as well as soil and subsurface
waters.230 The catalyst for environmental protection laws can still be
222 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the unrealistic model of how nature works that was
used to justify certain natural resource laws).
226 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
227 Holling et al., supra note 105, at 89.
228 See id. at 63–76.
229 See id.
230 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012).
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characterized as anthropocentric and premised on assumptions about an
inherent separateness between humans and nature. Humans in Era IV
recognized that while we were polluting and poisoning natural resources
and environmental goods, we were also contaminating natural systems
in a way that was harming us.231 The environmental protection laws of
Era IV assumed that humans could be regulated to rein in this anthropo-
morphic penchant to poison our surroundings, by managing the human
interface with the natural environment.
By Era IV, it became even more obvious that there were indeed
planetary boundaries. Although we began to suspect the presence of these
limits to resource use in Era II, in Era IV planetary boundaries became
undeniable.232 The role of humans in transgressing Earth’s limits and
producing perhaps unalterable changes in planetary systems is also becom-
ing less debatable.233 Laws in Era IV, nonetheless, seem to have fully em-
braced a model of human behavior based on resource economics and homo
economicus.234 This model presumes that humans are best regulated if
they are told what not to do, or if their actions that adversely affect envi-
ronmental goods are punished.235 Consistent with this model, laws would
impose on humans the costs of their environmentally harmful actions, so
that humans do not engage in the behaviors that produce the harm. But,
as we will see below, humans are equally motivated (or more efficiently
motivated) by laws encouraging them to do something. Era IV’s more
negative laws, grounded in the “rational man” wishing to avoid costs,
have proven to be less successful than laws based on a more nuanced and
realistic model of human behavior.
Era IV’s environmental protection laws by and large continued
the tradition of previous eras by keeping the central purpose of these
laws the promotion of human welfare.236 Lawmakers only contemplated
laws that placed limits on human consumption, when the idea of preserv-
ing or protecting natural resources and ecological systems was beneficial
to humans.237 Nevertheless, throughout Era IV people more and more
231 See generally Holmes Rolston III, Is There an Ecological Ethic?, 85 ETHICS 93, 98
(1975) (discussing the idea that humans were not the only natural organisms that deserved
to be protected).
232 See Johan Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space
for Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 32 (2009) [hereinafter Rockström, Planetary Boundaries].
233 See id.
234 See Mamlyuk, supra note 90, at 62–63.
235 See id. at 42–44.
236 John Passmore, Attitudes in Nature, in NATURE & CONDUCT 259 (R.S. Peters ed. 1975).
237 See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 119 (explaining that nature and natural resources had
derivative values, not intrinsic values in of themselves).
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questioned the soundness of purely anthropocentric laws.238 Humans
began to realize that both humans and nature were being negatively
impacted by environmental pollution.239 This recognition represents a
departure from the common understanding in Era III, which was solely
centered on the impact environmental degradation and contamination had
on humans. By contrast, in Era IV, an environmental ethic emerged in the
public discourse that voiced concern about the threats to Earth itself.240
Despite this growing recognition that nature and natural objects
have intrinsic value, not derivative of human welfare, Era IV protection
laws continue to be dominated by anthropocentric ideals. For instance, the
focus of the Clean Air Act is to prevent atmospheric pollution for human
health and welfare, not because of the greenhouse gases which may result
in climate change that disables the natural systems necessary for Earth’s
biosphere.241 And the parent statute of Era IV—the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969—requires an environmental impact assessment
only when actions might affect the quality of “the human environment.”242
The anthropocentric assumptions of human separateness and
superiority also continue to be present in Era IV. Separation is reflected
in environmental ethics that simultaneously elevate nature to a morally
superior position, while perceiving humans as a taint upon the pristine
and perfectly balanced conditions of the natural world.243 However,
during Era IV humans still occupy a dominant position in the natural
world. This dominance is reflected in part by the tendency to assign to
humans the duty to serve as stewards to, and self-righteous protectors
of, nature.244 Era IV laws seek to manage natural forces by reining in
human tendencies to treat environmental sinks as garbage dumps for our
238 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 203.
239 See generally Purdy, The Politics of Nature, supra note 154, at 1160 (“[A]n ‘ecological’
awareness of natural and human phenomena as pervasively interconnected [arose].”).
240 “Environmental ethics . . . sought to replace [the] spiritualism and deism [of pres-
ervationist laws] with hard ethical imperatives.” Tarlock, supra note 212, at 191. How-
ever, it is debatable whether this effort gained any momentum outside of the academic
sphere. Id.
241 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2012); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (the Clean Air Act does not compel a definition of “air
pollutant” that includes greenhouse gases).
242 42 U.S.C. § 4332(b) (emphasis added); see also Purdy, The Politics of Nature, supra
note 154, at 1160 (discussing that “concern with the public-health effects of pollution”
still formed the basis for environmental protection laws).
243 Wiener, Law and the New Ecology, supra note 40, at 343.
244 Purdy, American Natures, supra note 37, at 189, 197.
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economic progress. Such laws are still grounded in notions of human
independence from, and superiority to, the rest of nature.245
Another hallmark of Era IV protection laws is the desire to achieve
environmental goals in more economically efficient ways.246 Many envi-
ronmental protection laws are consistent with the principles developed
by resource economists, who have argued that we need to utilize eco-
nomic models to control human exploitation and consumption of natural
resources.247 Legal protections of ecosystem services are based on human-
centric economic values, where the assumption has been that restrictions
of environmental goods as waste dumps will provide measurable long-
term economic benefits to humans.248 These advantages are thought to
offset the short-term disadvantages of forgoing or limiting development
by making pollution more costly.
Era IV laws reflected this assumption by telling polluters not to
pollute environmental goods, or face stiff penalties and cleanup costs.249
Era IV laws were also modeled on the presumed behavior of homo
economicus, who prefers to make choices in markets where supplies are
limited. To mimic this behavior, economists advanced systems that al-
located transferable private property rights in pollution emissions.250
Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment is a leading example of a
trading program that created markets which allocated waste discharge
costs to regulated firms that had the lowest control costs.251
Era IV’s assumptions of protecting environmental goods continue
to rely on a model of human behavior grounded in the assumption that
245 Id. at 212–13.
246 Alyson C. Flournoy, The Case for the National Environmental Legacy Act, in BEYOND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 5 (A. Flournoy & D. Driesen eds. 2010); Daniel H. Cole & Peter
Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999).
247 Flournoy, supra note 246, at 4–5.
248 Id.
249 See, e.g., The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012) (requiring cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste
sites, where those responsible for the land contamination may be jointly severally and
strictly liable for all cleanup costs).
250 J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND
ECONOMICS 107 (1968).
251 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2012) (“It is the intent of this subchapter to effectuate such reduc-
tions [of sulfur dioxide emissions] by requiring compliance by affected sources with prescribed
emission limitations by specified deadlines, which limitations may be met through alter-
native methods of compliance provided by an emission allocation and transfer system.”).
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humans are driven by a self-interested need to maximize one’s own welfare,
in particular, one’s economic welfare.252 Federal and state laws attempted
to make resource use as a pollution receptacle less economically viable;
other laws restricted the availability of natural resources and even envi-
ronmental goods by putting a limit on how much human use would be
tolerated; some laws penalized resource developers and users with taxes
or flat bans.253 These laws are consistent with the prevailing standard
economic model that humans need to be told how to behave, and need to
be directed on what not to do. Otherwise, humans would instinctively
exploit resources and goods to benefit themselves and blindly maximize
their welfare in accordance with the homo economicus model.254
III. TOWARDS A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCE LAWS
In order to step away from the failed environmental laws of the
past, what is needed is an approach grounded on a more accurate model
of nature and human behavior. Part III proposes a more realistic model
252 Mamlyuk, supra note 90, at 70 (explaining that the core values of the homo economicus
model are individualism and self-interest).
253 See, e.g., Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a) (2012) (providing
that “[n]o person may excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface . . . any
archeological resource located on public lands or Indian lands”); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271, 1281
(a) (2012) (imposing a flat prohibition on resource-use proposals that may hinder the
scenic value of some rivers or have a negative aesthetic effect on people wishing to view
and recreate on these rivers); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-10-101 (2014) (declaring that the
state’s policy was to protect, preserve, enhance, and manage outdoor recreation areas “for
the use, benefit, and enjoyment of the people of this state and visitors of this state.”); see
also United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
26/Rev.1(Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (illustrating the polluter pays principle, which
requires a polluting private party or nation to bear the cost of their pollution as a method
of abating and allocating harm to the environment).
254 See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (the state
police power includes the ability to enact zoning regulations that restrict land use decisions
by property owners in order to promote citizen health, safety, and welfare); Goldberg,
supra note 131, at 194–95 (“Government possessed the authority to tell land owners for
which purposes the owners’ land could be used. . . . Planning would still give property owners
the right to improve their lands, but within limits and in accordance with the values
enunciated by states and localities.”). In Part III, this Article offers an alternative to the
standard economic model that guides environmental laws, and emphasizes laws that are
more interested in how to encourage humans to create positive externalities, as opposed
to the current legal regime that is focused on rules prohibiting negative externalities.
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of nature, which would be rooted in complex adaptive systems (“CAS”)
analysis. CAS theory reflects the true dynamic nature of natural processes
much better than the historic idea that nature acts like a self-regulating,
predictable machine. Likewise, a more realistic model of human behavior
would be embedded in both the deliberative rational and the emotional
intuitive model of humans, as opposed to the overly simplified homo
economicus model. Part III offers an alternative to the standard economic
model that has in the past guided past environmental laws. This alterna-
tive model emphasizes laws that encourage humans to create positive
externalities, as opposed to the current legal regime that is focused on
punitive rules prohibiting negative externalities.
A. Humans as Part of Nature, Not Apart from Nature
Contrary to the belief system that has dominated natural resources
and environmental laws, humans are not independent from and superior
to nature; humans instead are dependent upon the natural systems within
which they exist as merely a single species, albeit a particularly destruc-
tive one. The continued availability of natural resources and the sustained
functioning of certain ecological life-supporting processes are absolutely
necessary to support both human life and all organic life on the planet.255
Although humans are dependent upon nature, humans and nature exist
interdependently as well. All human actions have effects on the natural
systems contextualizing those actions. The rules governing the dynamics
of the natural world govern humans, too. Indeed, human evolution itself
seems linked to, and is likely caused by, environmental variability.256
And despite an otherwise persistent anthropomorphic belief, the laws
governing natural processes, rather than the laws of humans, usually
reign supreme.
Well-established principles within the natural sciences have
demonstrated our genetic connection to all living things.257 This connec-
tion does not mean that humans occupy a position of superiority within
nature; rather they occupy a position of dependence. The reality is that
255 See Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries, supra note 232, at 33.
256 C. Magill, G. Ashley, & K. Freeman, Ecosystem Variability and Early Human Habitats
in Eastern Africa, 110 PNAS 1167–74 (2013) (discussing the emergence and dispersal of
Homo erectus two million years ago in Africa, which impacted local ecosystems).
257 WACKERNAGEL & REES, supra note 32, at 4–5; P. Wesley Schultz, Inclusion with
Nature: The Psychology of Human Nature Relations, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, 61–78 (P. Schmuck et al. 2002).
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humanity’s sustainability is contingent on natural systems and processes,
not the reverse.258
The healthy functioning of life-supporting processes at a global
and an ecosystem level is the natural dynamic that permits humans to
survive.259 While humans’ dependence on specific natural resources is
apparent and well understood, what is less commonly perceived is
humans’ connection to the services provided by ecological systems. Eco-
systems and Earth-based systems ensure that the biosphere continues
to meet the specific environmental conditions required for human life.260
The earth is not valuable solely as a storehouse repository of stock and
renewable natural resources for humans to extract and use, which has
been the focus of so many natural resource laws, as recounted in Part II
of this Article. Rather, our survival requires the continued functioning
of the biosphere and natural systems, where environmental laws have
been strangely silent.261
Moreover, nature is not a machine that functions “according to
fixed and unvarying rules” or is “something that has been built.”262 This
belief fosters the mistaken idea that humans are independent from
nature, and that we are outsiders viewing nature exogenously.263 The
reality, however, is that humans are “[i]n concert with the other animals,
with the plants, and with the microbes themselves, . . . [and] are an active
part of the Earth’s atmosphere, constantly circulating the breath of this
planet through our bodies and brains.”264
To step towards an approach that recognizes the interdependence
of humans and nature, laws need to move away from the problematic
characteristics of anthropomorphism and separation that have defined the
traditional legal approach to dealing with humans and the environment.
A new “Era V”—an “ecocentric” era—would be characterized by natural
resources and environmental laws where humans are part of an intricate
framework that makes up the world, not detached or superior to it.265
258 Flournoy, supra note 246, at 4.
259 Id. at 5.
260 See Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries, supra note 232, at 33.
261 Carl Folke et al., Reconnecting to the Biosphere, 40 AMBIO 719 (2011) (discussing the
effects of societal advances on planetary systems).
262 Abrams, supra note 57, at 66.
263 Id. at 66–68.
264 Id. at 71.
265 See generally Leiss, supra note 10 (explaining that humans calculate the “world as
prey” and separate themselves from nature in order to master it).
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Also, instead of reflecting a distinct separateness which presumes
human superiority and exceptionalism,266 Era V laws should concentrate
on the negative effects human activities have on natural resources, not
simply the impact human actions affecting nature have on humans. Most
Era IV environmental laws are typically justified on anthropomorphic
grounds, since humans generally do not modify their actions without some
perceived threat to their own welfare.267 Era V environmental laws should
instead be grounded in ecocentric rationales, where humans engage in
more environmentally conscious behaviors where they more fully assimi-
late with, and become a part of, nature.268
B. Laws Grounded in More Accurate Models
Environmental laws should not rely on inaccurate models about
how either nature works or humans behave and make decisions.269 A
more accurate explanation of how natural processes operate relies on
CAS theory. A CAS-based understanding of nature embraces the belief
that natural systems flourish when there is constant, relatively unpre-
dictable, non-linear change. This more realistic model also acknowledges
that humans are inherently embedded within naturally occurring changes
that take place in the world; human actions are not separate or detached
from natural systems.270
Another parallel model involves human decision-making. This
model is grounded in the idea that humans behave both as deliberative
rational beings and emotional, altruistic intuitive organisms. Such a
view presumes that humans are not just self-interested benefit seekers,
but instead are more complex figures that sometimes make choices with-
out any direct benefit to the human actor. Laws seeking to alter behaviors
should realize that we are sometimes influenced by cognitive biases, not
just welfare maximization.271
266 See infra Parts I.B.1 & I.B.2.
267 See Doremus, supra note 67, at 21.
268 See De Young, supra note 69, at 517; Kaplan, supra note 69, at 498; Doremus, supra
note 67, at 15.
269 The first model, discussed in Part I.B.1, is the idea that nature will always achieve
stability if left alone, and that nature is self-regulating. The second inaccurate theory,
described in Part I.B.2, is the homo economicus model which presumes that humans are
rational actors driven by the self-interested need to maximize one’s own welfare.
270 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113.
271 SUNSTEIN, supra note 16; see Cohen, supra note 138 (“[D]evelopments in psychology
have required qualification of the ‘rational choice’ model of economic behavior.”).
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1. Nature as Complex Adaptive Systems
Humans are a subsystem within natural systems comprising the
much larger planetary biosphere.272 Principles governing the workings
of natural systems direct humans’ interactions with the rest of nature.
Natural systems function as complex adaptive systems and exhibit a
number of characteristic properties that have implications for the ways
humans interact with the rest of nature. For example, natural systems
do not follow linear dynamics.273 The non-linearity property of ecological
systems means that the effects of human interventions in ecosystems
cannot be accurately predicted.274 Ecological systems are dynamic and
can exist in multiple stability configurations.275 When humans try to im-
pose their cause-and-effect assumptions upon natural surroundings that
are so dynamic that foreseeability is impossible, the result of the human
intervention can be unintended and unexpected.276
Era IV environmental laws often view the earth’s natural systems
as closely integrated, self-regulating, complex, but capable of being system-
atically understood by humans, who eventually can make reasonable
guesses about human inputs and environmental outputs. CAS theory
disputes this perception, and holds instead that biological systems have
features consisting of resilience, diversity, redundancy, and compartmen-
talization, which permits the system’s components to be separated and
then combined, despite intrinsic and extrinsic disturbances.277 CAS theory
suggests that when humans used Era III laws to separate ecosystems in
order to create preservation “islands,” (e.g., parks, monuments, refuges,
and wilderness areas), these islands may not be healthy or sustainable.278
They are not designed to operate consistent with CAS theory, but accord-
ing to human wishes. We have, in other words, tried to create environ-
ments that reflect how we want natural systems to work, not how they
272 WACKERNAGEL & REES, supra note 32, at 4.
273 Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 40 (2010).
274 Id.
275 Craig Anthony Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law and Resilience, 43 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10426–27 (2013). Humans and their legal institutions often
overlook or ignore a number of key characteristics of complex adaptive systems in favor of
erroneous anthropogenic assumptions about nature. Id. A common misperception regard-
ing nature, reflected in many resource preservation laws, is that it exists in or actively
moves towards a stable equilibrium state. Id.
276 See id. at 15.
277 See id. at 21–22.
278 See generally Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 275.
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do work. Era V’s more ecocentric laws reflecting CAS theory would in-
tegrate and connect these preservation islands, so that unpredictable
changes and recombinations of a system’s components can take place.279
Era V ecocentric laws might also seek to reflect “social-ecological
systems” (“SES”) theory, which holds that a more natural reality is com-
prised of coupled human and ecological systems.280 SES theory reflects
the fact that any human-derived divide between humans and nature is
artificial and arbitrary.281 SES theory is based on the view that anthropo-
morphic social systems, and the ecological systems within which they are
embedded, constitute not two separate regimes, but instead a single com-
plex system that possesses its own resilience, multiple stability domains,
and thresholds.282
Environmental and natural resource laws consistent with CAS
theory recognize that ecosystems do not simply exist in a state of stasis,
but are instead governed by various dynamic, nonlinear, interdependent
processes.283 Such laws should also reflect, consistent with SES theory,
that human-caused air, water, and land pollution is taking place within
a single complex system, comprised of both humans and natural systems.
Environmental pollution is not some exogenous reality, apart from humans,
but a manifestation of a dysfunction within a world where nature and
humans co-exist.284
2. Humans as Both Deliberative Rational Beings and Emotionally
Intuitive Organisms
Humans are complex creatures guided by a variety of motivations.
For centuries the standard model presumed that the central influence was
selfishness and welfare maximization.285 But more and more behavioral
psychologists realize that selflessness and altruism are also important.286
279 See generally Jason Blevins, Two Groups Join Hands Over Lands, DENVER POST, Sept. 12,
2014, at 8A (describing a plan connecting “hundreds of thousands of acres that the
[conservation] groups have locked into conservation easements [so that the areas] will
endure as wild, natural open spaces”).
280 Folke et al., supra note 261, at 719 (discussing the effects of societal advances on
planetary systems).
281 Id. at 720.
282 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113–16.
283 See Holling et al., supra note 105, at 64.
284 Id.
285 SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 6.
286 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 15, at 270–71; SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 6–12; Cohen,
supra note 138.
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In reality, humans are not rational actors driven only by the self-interested
need to maximize one’s own welfare.287 Era V laws that are more consistent
with a balanced and nuanced picture of human decision-making incorpo-
rate both the deliberative and rational model and the emotional intuitive
model of human behavior.288
Modern behavioral economists and neuroeconomists have skewed
the Era IV assumption that human beings are almost always rational in
their decision-making.289 In reality, humans do not deliberately and ration-
ally weigh costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, but instead
make choices based on other influences, such as altruism, fairness, team-
work, or the choices of others.290 The implications are significant for law-
makers contemplating environmental protection rules. If individuals make
choices based on influences other than rational self-interest, if uncertainty
and more “bounded” rationality are equally powerful motivators, and if
humans are influenced by a desire to be cooperative and improve their
natural world, then environmental laws based primarily on the homo
economicus model may not be successful.291
Unlike standard economic theory that relies on the homo eco-
nomicus model,292 which emphasizes coercive laws that either command
humans how to behave or seek to deter or punish them (e.g., with higher
costs or oppressive taxes) for behaviors that run contrary to environmental
policies,293 behavioral economics suggests that governments can perhaps
287 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 15; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (“The absence of sustained and compre-
hensive economic analysis of legal rules from a perspective informed by insights about actual
human behavior makes for a significant contrast with many other fields of economics, where
such ‘behavioral’ analysis has become relatively common.”).
288 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 15; SUNSTEIN, supra note 16.
289 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
290 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); Peter Earl, Why Evolution Wouldn’t Favour Homo
Economicus, OUPBLOG (Dec. 11, 2013), https://blog.oup.com/2013/12/evolution-homo
-economicus-homo-sapiens-enjoy-sex/, archived at http://perma.cc/7RTV-DBGF.
291 DANIEL COHEN, HOMO ECONOMICUS: THE (LOST) PROPHET OF MODERN TIMES 4 (2014);
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COL-
LECTIVE ACTION (1990); Richard Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 133, 134–40 (2000).
292 Levin et al., supra note 14, at 113–15 (explaining that the homo economicus model per-
ceives nature too simply as a closely integrated, self-regulating, complex system that works
best when left alone by humans). This view is not consistent with the science of how nature
really works, which is as complex adaptive systems whose central features include resilience,
diversity, redundancy, modularity (compartmentalization), and nonlinear feedback loops. Id.
293 See Rod McGuirk, Demise of Australia’s Carbon Tax May Be Warning for U.S. Proposal,
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better realize environmental goals by noncoercive means.294 Humans may
be more responsive if Era V ecocentric laws rely less on economic punish-
ment, and instead encourage us to act a certain way; when our actions re-
sult in nonfinancial emotional and psychological rewards, natural resources
and natural systems are also the beneficiaries.295 The creation of a posi-
tive externality elicits a more efficient and sympathetic response than the
imposition of a penalty for imposing a negative externality. For example,
state and local land use laws that encourage humans to provide ecological
dedications as a precondition for development, or by promoting the use
of conservation easements, may receive a more receptive human reaction
than flat bans.296
C. Environmental Laws that Work
Effective and more realistic environmental and natural resource
laws would be built on two foundations. First, such Era V ecocentric laws
would impose an affirmative duty on humans to make choices consistent
with ecological integrity and planetary boundaries. Era V laws would not
be intent on punishing human behavior deemed harmful to environmen-
tal systems, such as many Era IV laws that tell humans what not to do.
Era V ecocentric laws would instead encourage humans to do affirmative
acts consistent with more workable models of (1) nature as a “complex
adaptive system,” and (2) humans as both deliberative rational beings
and emotional intuitive organisms.297 These new Era V laws would create
incentives for humans to create positive ecocentric externalities. The
establishment of an affirmative duty imposed on humans would be
coupled with a parallel legal recognition that nature, natural resources,
and natural processes should be granted a legally recognized right to
resist certain human interventions.298 Natural resources could exercise
this right when humans take actions that threaten ecological integrity,
DENVER POST, July 7, 2014, at 14A (discussing how a homo economicus based regulation
has failed in Australia).
294 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) (describing how humans can be persuaded
or “nudge[d]” into making different decisions).
295 See id.; infra Part III.C.1.
296 Goldberg, supra note 131, at 191 (explaining that certain types of zoning regulations
block high-intensity development by simultaneously ensuring the preservation of natural
landscapes); see Blevins, supra note 279.
297 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 16; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 294, at 6–8, 65–66.
298 LAITOS, supra note 27, at 208–09.
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or transgress fixed planetary boundaries, or interfere with the workings
of natural complex adaptive systems.299
1. Impose Affirmative Duties on Humans
If humans are emotional intuitive beings, not strictly rational
entities relentlessly striving towards their own self-interest, then Era V
laws should not rely only on flat bans and mandates, but instead should
use default rules and more incentivized bottom-up decision-making.300
Rather than rely on rules that seek to prevent humans from creating
environmental damage by penalizing their bad behavior, new laws would
either obligate humans, or create incentives for humans, to produce positive
externalities.301 For example, if a dam was proposed that altered a nat-
ural watercourse that was a habitat to an endangered bird species, then
the dam builders should have the duty to compensate for any habitat loss
by producing an alternative habitat that would permit the birds to flour-
ish despite the dam. And the dam builders should be made to realize that
the benefit of encouraging and even creating species habitat has both
psychological and even an economic spillover effect on the dam builders,
who will more likely to green-light future dam projects.
The rationale behind such “libertarian paternalism” is that when
governments structure the choices available to humans in such a way as
to gently persuade them in the desired direction, humans will ultimately
make decisions consistent with social goals, regardless of their own self-
interest.302 For example, one way to help guide humans’ choices is to fully
disclose information to people to enable them to make informed decisions
that go beyond an individual’s desire for short-term welfare maximi-
zation.303 Humans are altruistic beings, who “care about being treated
fairly and want to treat others fairly if those others are themselves be-
having fairly.”304 When given a range of choices in a system that recog-
nizes humans as both deliberative rational beings that will seek to ensure
their long-term benefit, and emotional intuitive entities that look beyond
individual self-actualization, humans generally make decisions that are
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302 Id. at 4–6, 11, 22–37 (discussing various cognitive tools that can guide people into
making better decisions).
303 Admin. Off. Info. and Reg. Aff., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
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conducive to policy goals. That is, humans tend to be “concerned about the
well-being of others, even strangers in some circumstances, and this con-
cern and their self-conception can lead them in the direction of cooperation
at the expense of their material self-interest (and sometimes spite, also
at the expense of their material self-interest).”305
An example of a law that seems to be problematic because it
commands or tells humans not do something, is a moratorium issued by
the Bureau of Land Management that prohibits leasing of public lands
by energy companies where the land is the habitat for the Gunnison sage
grouse.306 Members of the oil, gas, and coal industry have vowed to fight
this command and control regulation.307 Natural resource developers,
wrapped in an Era I and Era II mentality argue that the federal govern-
ment’s moratorium is negatively impacting employment prospects and
economic development in the affected communities, without reliable infor-
mation that the ban will even be beneficial for the sage grouse.308 That
kind of formidable opposition will either delay implantation of the mora-
torium or perhaps weaken it or cause its demise.309 An Era V ecocentric
approach would integrate the resource developers’ social and economic
wish to be respected by and partnered with environmental interests, as
a well as valued by shareholders. Instead of a moratorium, a duty to pro-
vide habitat for sage grouse might have yielded a better result.
It would seem that a law that instructs people how to behave has
higher prospects for success than a law that punishes resource develop-
ers by imposing a ban or moratorium. Take for example an initiative by
the U.S. Energy Department that is providing $167 million for a project
that aims to reduce coal-fired power plant pollution.310 The initiative is
part of a larger scale program that funds carbon capture projects.311 The
305 Id. at 1545.
306 Bruce Finley, Feds Block Energy Leasing of Sage Grouse Habitat, DENVER POST, June 17,
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/2014/05/11/western-states-worry-decision-on-birds-fate-could-cost-billions-in-development/,
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carbon capture program, which coincides with an Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) proposal to limit the release of carbon dioxide from
coal-fired plants, may reduce greenhouse gases from coal and provide a
mechanism for reinvigorating otherwise depleted oil and gas fields, whose
use as an energy fuel produces less pollution than coal.312
2. Generating Positive Externalities
Laws that are based on preventing negative externalities are
founded on the anthropocentric belief that humans do not change their
behavior unless the costs of continuing the behavior are so impactful that
the human will decide to forgo or modify that behavior.313 Such laws are
grounded in notions of human desires to avoid costs and minimize penal-
ties.314 The syllogism reflected in such laws is that if human behavior
produces a negative environmental externality (e.g., pollution), then to
alter the behavior and remove the negative externality, humans should
be deterred from producing that externality, by reflecting in the behavior
the true cost of the behavior that is otherwise causing the externality.315
Many Era IV environmental laws were designed only to curb negative
environmental externalities.316 What seems relatively untried as a means
of bringing about environmentally sound decisions is reliance on laws
that seek to generate positive externalities.
capture of CO2 from fuel combustion or industrial processes, the transport of CO2 via
ships or pipelines, and its storage underground, in depleted oil and gas fields and deep
saline formations. CCS can have unique and vital role to play in the global transition to
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312 See Smith, supra note 310, at A4.
313 KAHNEMAN, supra note 15, at 269.
314 Id. at 269–70.
315 An externality is a cost that is not borne by the parties to a particular transaction. For
instance, when a manufacturing plant pollutes and its neighbor’s property becomes devalued
as a consequence of the pollution, the devaluation is a spillover cost, or negative externality
of allowing the plat to operate and pollute. Regulations that focus on preventing or re-
ducing negative externalities are designed to compensate for the deleterious impacts of
decisions that create such results, or negative externalities. See generally Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) (“Insisting that landowners
internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-
use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.”)
(citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)); Am. Coatings Ass’n,
Inc. v. S. Coast Air Quality Dist., 278 P.3d 838, 851 (Cal. 2012) (explaining that, in
general, industry does not have sufficient “incentive to develop or adopt new pollution control
technology in the absence of regulation” since “pollution is a negative externality”).
316 See supra Part II.D.
50 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:1
Command-and-control regulations that wish to abate negative exter-
nalities often leave no bargaining power for firms, and are mandatory if
a firm desires to participate in a certain market.317 By contrast, Voluntary
Environmental Programs (“VEPs”) are designed to “induce firms to produce
positive environmental externalities beyond what [existing] government
regulations require.”318 For example, with certain types of VEPs, there are
“collaborative arrangements between firms and regulators in which firms
voluntarily commit to actions that improve the natural environment.”319
When the federal regulator is EPA, the agency will reward the firm that
participates in a VEP with non-homo economicus benefits by publicizing
the firm’s participation in the VEP and pollution prevention record.320
The benefits to the firm are in the form of goodwill, not welfare maximi-
zation. These kinds of Era V laws may be able to encourage positive indus-
try actions more effectively than laws that punish failure to comply.321
3. Grant Nature Rights
An anthropomorphic legal right granted to natural resources will
further help to unify humans and nature, which are now perceived in
many environmental laws as being separate. What, then, should be the
rights granted to nature? There are four basic rights, similar to those
traditionally given to humans: (1) a right to exist; “(2) a right of personal
protection; (3) a right to liberty;” and (4) a right to have these rights
legally recognized by the government.322 A right to exist provides nature
a biocentric right when human interference threatens to harm living
organisms.323 A right to personal protection includes the right of the re-
source to be protected from human activity which destroys its ecological
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integrity and ability to provide planetary services.324 A right to liberty
allows nature to function as it otherwise would without exogenous human
intervention.325 Finally, a right to have legally recognized rights would
provide nature and natural objects some legal mechanism to assert these
rights when they are threatened by human actions.326
Environmental laws that provide natural rights provide nature,
natural resources, and natural processes a means to resist human inter-
ventions that adversely affect natural systems. If humans are to engage
in behaviors that threaten ecological integrity, transgress planetary
boundaries, or interfere with the workings of complex adaptive systems,
the act of bestowing nature with legally recognizable anthropomorphic
rights should permit more of an equivalency between natural systems
and human actions.
CONCLUSION
A new era of ecocentric environmental and natural resource laws
would (1) impose affirmative duties on humans, (2) be more interested
in actions that generate positive externalities, and (3) grant nature rights.
These Era V laws would recognize that humans are intricately a part of,
and firmly embedded with, the natural world. Ecocentric laws would be
grounded in more accurate models of how humans and nature work,
and would no longer cling to impractical notions of humans as superior
entities—separate and detached from the earth’s ecosystems, unhindered
by fixed planetary boundaries. By reflecting CAS theory and a model of
humans as both deliberative rational beings and emotional intuitive
organisms, such laws could bring about much needed, and much healthier,
balance between humans and nature.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 See, e.g., David S. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other
Contested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2004); Jan G. Laitos, Standing and Environ-
mental Harm: The Double Paradox, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 56 (2013).
